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THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE
LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS
Spencer Weber Waller
"[D]iscourse is institutional doing and the language it entails."'
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust since its inception has relied heavily on economic
discourse and price theory in particular in recent times. There
have been fierce debates on what types of economics are the most
useful and whether other values inform antitrust law and policy,
but economics has reigned supreme, especially during the modern
era.
This is quite peculiar in the following sense. Antitrust is a
body of law that regulates business behavior, but antitrust has adopted
a language both different, and at odds with, the language of the very
people being regulated. Even worse, antitrust has chosen a unique
discourse that is self-denying as to one of the very essences of anti-
trust enforcement. Price theory is inherently suspicious of the claim
that market power is achievable. In contrast, business leaders are
trained beginning in undergraduate and graduate business programs
and throughout their careers that the very opposite is true: that market
power is achievable and various business and management theories
provide a sound analytical basis for achieving such power in the real
world.
t Professor and Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola Univer-
sity Chicago School of Law. Of Counsel, Kaye Scholer LLP, New York City. A substantial
portion of the work on this article took place while I was a member of the faculty of Brooklyn
Law School. I thank all my former colleagues for their friendship and support over the past
decade; Ms. Eileen Josephson of the Kaye Scholer law firm and Ms. Whitney Bagnall of the
Columbia Law School library for their assistance in gaining access to the papers of Professor
Milton Handler, Howard Bergman, Jim Fanto, Bert Foer, David Gerber, Ted Janger, Michael
Jacobs, Leo Raskind, and Larry Solan for their helpful comments; Wose Turn Ebba and Camel-
lia Noriega for their research assistance; and workshops at DePaul University College of Law,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Fordham
University School of Law which generated many helpful suggestions and critiques. I gratefully
acknowledge the financial support of both Brooklyn Law School and Loyola University Chi-
cago School of Law through summer research stipends.
I ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW AS GOVERNANCE 8 (1994).
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This article is both a history and genealogy 2 of the discourse
used in the discipline of antitrust law. My thesis is that antitrust
adopted economics as its primary discourse as part of the creation
of a separate discipline of antitrust, separate from a general field of
business law or corporate and securities law. The split began in
the 1920s and came to full fruition in the 1950s.3 Without suggest-
ing that this was a conscious or deliberate choice, antitrust evolved
into a new specialty field with its own players, its own profes-
sional organizations, its own status games and hierarchies, and
most importantly, its own language. Economics became that lan-
guage as part of a process of separation from the general business
bar which remained tied to the language of business, a language
that was increasingly discredited socially and professionally dur-
ing the Great Depression, the key period when antitrust became its
own field.
The premises and methodology of this article derive in sub-
stantial part from the writings of Michel Foucault, particularly in
his work of uncovering the archeology and genealogy of the
growth of power through the creation of scientific and professional
disciplines and specialized discourses. While the teachings of
Foucault have been extensively applied in legal scholarship, they
rarely have been utilized for the analysis of the growth and devel-
opment of antitrust law and policy.
4
2 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 83 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE] ("What
[genealogy] really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disquali-
fied, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter,
hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge .... "). For more on Foucault's
views on discourse, truth, and power see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWL-
EDGE AND THE DISCOURSE OF LANGUAGE (Alan Sheridan trans., 1972) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
ARCHAEOLOGY]; FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 82-87, 117, 126-33, 233; sources
cited infra note 4.
3 See infra notes 6-40 and accompanying text.
4 The principal scholar to have done so is Rudolph Peritz whose work helped inspire this
project. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW (1996). Readers interested in an introduction to the work of Michel Foucault
will benefit from MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) and
HUNT & WIcKHAM, supra note 1. More serious readers interested in Foucault's principal texts
should consult FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 2; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF
THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (Alan Sheridan trans., 1973);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 3 THE HISTORY OF SExUALITY: THE CARE OF THE SELF (Robert
Hurley trans., 1986); MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 2 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF
PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1985); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A
HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (Richard Howard trans., 1965); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage
Books 1994) (1966); FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2.
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My paper is also a plea for a more inclusive discourse for
modem antitrust. Business people are versed from the first days of
business school in the language and techniques of strategic plan-
ning and brand management. They strive for and often achieve
significant lasting market power. As the Chicago school style of
law and economics loses its vise grip on the discipline of antitrust,
lawyers, judges, and policy makers need to be conversant with all
facets of business theory and discourse, not just undergraduate
level economic theory. In short, the decision makers we regulate
take this stuff seriously, so should we.
I. THE BIRTH OF A DISCIPLINE
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of
truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one
to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each
is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the
acquisition of truth; and the status of those who are charged with
saying what counts as true.
When the Sherman Act was passed in 1890,6 there was no spe-
cialized antitrust discipline or a specialized antitrust branch of the
practicing bar or legal academy. The formal markers of the spe-
cialized discourse of a true antitrust discipline did not appear until
the 1920s and early 1930s. By then, the Sherman Act had been
supplemented by three additional antitrust statutes7 and the courts
5 FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 2, at 131. See also RICHARD WHITLEY,
THE INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENCES 30 (1984) (stating that
reputational communities in the sciences "organize themselves as distinct collectives within
their own communication system and evaluation criteria"); Robert Dingwall, Introduction, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS, AND OTHERS 5 (Robert Dingwall
& Phillip Lewis eds., 1983) (pointing out that "[professions] set the very terms of thinking about
problems which fall in their domain").
6 While the Sherman Act was the first federal antitrust statute, there were prior state anti-
trust laws going back as far as 1880. See generally James May, Antitrust Practice and Proce-
dure in the Fonnative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law,
1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 495 (1987) (examining the early history of early antitrust juris-
prudence). There was also an 1889 federal antitrust law enacted in Canada. See An Act for the
Preservation and Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, ch. 41, S.C.
(1889) (Can.).
7 The principal subsequent antitrust statutes include the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq., 44 (1994). The Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 21a (1994), while generally included among the antitrust
laws, had a variety of non-antitrust goals relating to the preservation of small business. Less
significant subsequent early antitrust statutes included the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11
(1994), the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994), and arguably the Antidumping Act
of 1916, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 should be included as well. Each of these statutes address specific
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
had decided dozens of antitrust cases. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion ("FTC") had been created in 1914 and the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") in 1933.8
Until the 1920s, antitrust was not even taught as a separate
subject in American law schools. To the extent it was taught at all,
it represented a small piece of such courses as Contracts, Corpora-
tions, or Business Planning.
9
The first recognizable course in antitrust law appears to have
been offered at Columbia in 1923 by Professor Herman Oliphant.
Professor Oliphant's Trade Regulation course included both the
substance and procedure of what modem students would recognize
as antitrust law, but also materials on trademarks and the common
law of unfair competition, topics more typically covered today in
intellectual property courses. While Professor Oliphant had a pub-
lished casebook for this course, there is no evidence that this book
was used by anyone other than Professor Oliphant's own Columbia
students. 1 The first modern casebook that was ultimately intended
and used for a broader audience did not appear until 1937.11 Both
of the principal peer-edited antitrust journals began publication in
1952.12
Law firms were similarly slow in recognizing antitrust as a
separate discipline. Few, if any, major law firms had separate anti-
trust departments until the early 1950s.' 3 The American Bar Asso-
antitrust issues in international trade and have little contemporary significance.5 See generally Symposium, In Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Estab-
lishment of the Antitrust Division, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 813 (1994) (offering several perspec-
tives on the value of the Antitrust Division).
9 See e.g., ARTHUR C. CAPORN, SELECTED CASES ILLUSTRATING THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 291-352 (3d ed. 1920); MICHAEL E. ROWE, CASES ON CONTRACT 162-179 (1927);
EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 514-97 (1928).
10 HERMAN OLIPHANT, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1923). By 1930, a professor at
Harvard Law School had developed a casebook for his students. JAMES ANGEL MCLAUGHLIN,
CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1933).
I1 MILTON H. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937). See
infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Handler's casebook.
12 The Antitrust Law Journal began publication in 1952 and is the official publication of
the Antitrust Law Section of the American Bar Association. The Antitrust Bulletin began
publication in 1952 and is published by Federal Publications. Both journals continue to publish
today. No student edited law review specializes in antitrust although the Loyola Consumer Law
Review published by Loyola University Chicago School of Law devotes a substantial portion of
its articles to antitrust. It began publication in 1988.13 For example, Kaye Scholer Fierman Hays & Handler was one of the earliest firms to
have a separate department for antitrust litigation thanks primarily to the associates recruited by
Milton Handler to handle the clients he attracted when he joined the firm as a partner in the
early 1950s. See MILTON HANDLER, AN ORAL HISTORY 350-51 (1992). For more on the role
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ciation ("ABA") did not even have a separate Antitrust Section
until 1952, with an attempt the prior year to organize a separate
section for antitrust having failed. Prior to 1952, antitrust lawyers
were limited to participation in a committee that was part of the
Corporations Banking and Business Section. 14 Similarly, the first
blue ribbon committee of the Attorney General to study the anti-
trust laws was convened in 195515 and the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York began its annual antitrust lecture in
1958.16
Two individuals stand out in the early period in defining anti-
trust as a separate discipline. They are Milton Handler and Thur-
man Arnold, who each helped define the discipline of antitrust as
academics, practitioners, and government policymakers. While
many other individuals contributed to the growth of antitrust as its
own field, these two individuals were leaders in different ways
during the formative era from the 1920s to the 1950s when anti-
trust came into its own.
Professor Handler attended Columbia Law School in the mid-
1920s and was a prot6g6 of Herman Oliphant, although Handler
never actually took the Trade Regulation course as a student. His
interest in antitrust stemmed from his 1926-27 clerkship with Jus-
tice Harlan Stone on the United States Supreme Court when Jus-
tice Stone assigned Handler the task of helping draft the seminal
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.'7 antitrust opinion. After
the end of his clerkship, Handler was asked to teach the Trade
Regulation course at Columbia during the summer of 1927 and
joined the Columbia law faculty full-time that fall. He taught the
course regularly after that with the support of Oliphant who gave
up the course in favor of his protdg6.
Handler's contribution to the rise of antitrust as an academic
discipline began shortly thereafter. His early scholarship dealt
with both antitrust and closely related trade regulation topics.' 8 He
of Professor Milton Handler in the establishment of antitrust as a separate discipline see infra
notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
14 Phone interview with Ms. Amy Peoples, Staff Director, Antitrust Section, American
Bar Association (Mar. 9, 2000) (memorandum on file with author). That section of the ABA is
now called the Business Law Section.
is REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE TO STUDY THE ANI-
TRUST LAws (1955).
16 These annual lectures have been collected in annotated form in the three-volume work,
MILTON HANDLER, ANTrrRUST IN TRANSITION (1991).
17 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See HANDLER, supra note 13, at 71.
18 See Milton Handler, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Public Interest, 18 A.B.A. J. 635
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organized the first academic symposium on the antitrust laws at
Columbia in 1932, resulting in both the publication of a special
symposium volume 19 as well as an issue of the Columbia Law Re-
view.2 °
Following service in the New Deal in Washington, D.C. and
on a consulting basis from New York,21 as well as difficult family
health problems,22 Handler published the first modem antitrust
casebook in 1937.23 That casebook is still in print in its fourth
edition, is widely used throughout American law schools, and has
such distinguished contemporary co-authors including the former
general counsel of the Securities Exchange Commission who is
also a noted antitrust authority at Columbia Law School, the cur-
rent chairman of the FTC, and a sitting Seventh Circuit judge, who
formerly taught antitrust at the University of Chicago Law
School.
24
The Handler casebook helped define the discipline of antitrust
as more than mere legal doctrine. Handler included economic and
historical material,25 although he has no formal training in either
field in an effort to show how the organization of business in its
then contemporary form had come about. This eclecticism contin-
(1932); Milton Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission I,
28 CoLUM. L. REV. 708, 708-33 (1928); Milton Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by
the Federal Trade Commission II, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 905-37 (1928); Milton Handler,
False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 23 (1929); Milton Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 179, 183 (1932); Milton Handler, The
Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Advertising, 31 CoLtuM. L. REv. 527
(1931); Milton Handler, The Sugar Institute Case and the Present Status of the Anti-Trust Laws,
36 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1936); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade
Names - An Analysis and Synthesis , 30 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 169-201 (1930); Milton Handler
& Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names - An Analysis and Synthesis II, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 759, 759-88 (1930); Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175, 175
(1936).
19 MILTON HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: A SYMPOSIUM (1932).
20 32 COLUM. L. REv. 173, 173-289 (1932).
21 Handler was the principal drafter for the legislation that created the Federal and Drug
Administration and served as the first general counsel for the National Labor Relations Board.
See HANDLER, supra note 13, at 129-86. His only government service in the antitrust area came
subsequently as the principal drafter of Monograph No. 38 for the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Commission. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
22 Handler's wife had a difficult childbirth during this era and was shortly thereafter
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. See HANDLER, supra note 13, at 196-201.
HANDLER, supra note 11.
24 MILTON HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1997).
25 See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 11, at 22-101, 274-385, 496-502 (discussing the early
stages of industrial development, and the legal and economic aspects of the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
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ued in subsequent editions of the casebook, which also included
excerpts from government reports on antitrust law and industrial
organization economics materials. 26 In a 1997 letter to Judge Rich-
ard Posner, Handler described his goals for the casebook as fol-
lows:
In my casebook I departed from the established approach.
I personally was puzzled about how the modern business
system came into existence because it was the current
business system to which antitrust applied. I did an elabo-
rate historical study, which I included in my casebook.
Since antitrust dealt with competition, I thought it was
important to have an analysis of that concept. I included
Walter Hamilton's article on the nature of competition
from the McMillan Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. In
this way, I got the students to know how the modern busi-
ness system came about; why competition was essential
for its proper functioning and what was meant by
competition.
In subsequent editions, I put in a vast amount of economic
readings .... 27
Handler's influence on both the teaching, practice, and en-
forcement policy of antitrust continued to grow through his work
in drafting Monograph No. 3828 of the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Commission which became one of the defining documents
for establishing federal antitrust policy in the post-New Deal era.
Handler also served on the 1955 Attorney General's Committee to
Review the Antitrust Laws, 9 in prominent positions in both the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Trade Regulation
Committee as well as the ABA Antitrust Section, and delivered the
annual New York City Bar antitrust lecture, now known as the
Handler lecture, while continuing to write numerous influential
articles in the field.3°
26 See HANDLER, supra note 24, at 1-2, 221-24, 484-98, 867-73, 942-65, 1005-14, 1038-
41.
27 Letter from Milton Handler to Richard Posner (Jan. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Posner Letter]
(copy on file with author).
28 MILTON HANDLER, TEMPoRARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION, MONOGRAPH 38,
7 6T
m CONG., A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS (Senate Comm. Print 1941).
29 See REPORT, supra note 15.
30 See HANDLER, supra note 16. Recent studies have found Handler to be among the top
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In addition to his academic workload, Handler became in-
creasingly interested in the practice of antitrust law. In 1951, he
began an association with the law firm eventually known as Kaye
Scholer Fierman Hays & Handler, shortly thereafter becoming a
name partner, and continued a full-time affiliation with the firm
from his retirement from the Columbia faculty in 1970 until his
death in 1998 at the age of 95. While in practice he participated in
a substantial part of the landmark antitrust litigation of his time
including numerous cases before the United States Supreme
Court,31 while continuing to write, lecture, and carry on volumi-
nous correspondence on antitrust and other subjects with the legal
and political luminaries of his era.32
The inspiring accomplishments of Professor Handler are
matched by those of Thurman Arnold who contributed to the
growth of a separate discipline of antitrust, like Handler, first as an
academic and later in government and private practice. Following
an initial legal and political career in his native Wyoming,33 Ar-
nold came east to pursue an academic career first as Dean of the
West Virginia University School of Law and later as a member of
the faculty of Yale Law School. Arnold was part of the smaller
branch of the Legal Realist movement that focused on governmen-
tal regulation of business activity rather than the operation of so-
called private law fields such as contracts and torts.
3 4
ten cited antitrust authorities both in the second half of both the 1960s and 1970s and among the
most highly cited scholars of all time. See MARC ALLEN EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE
TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 110-11 (1991) (placing Handler third in the reputational hierarchy of
the antitrust community from 1965-1970); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 425 (2000) (listing Handler with other legal scholars who have been cited
between 1,000 and 1,500 times).
31 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding that Otter
Tail Power Co. was liable for its refusal to deal with municipal power systems in order to pre-
vent or destroy their position in the market); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (holding
that Texaco engaged in unfair competition by inducing its dealers to purchase brands of tires,
batteries, and accessories for which it received sales commissions); United States v. Cont'l Can
Company, 375 U.S. 893 (1963) (holding that the U.S. proved a prima facie case of anticompeti-
tive effect under the Clayton Act after Continental Can, the second largest producer of metal
containers, acquired the third largest producer of glass containers); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (affirming convictions under the Sherman Act against the American
Tobacco Co. because its behavior showed both the power and the intent to monopolize).
32 These materials are available for perusal in the Milton Handler Rare Book and Reading
Room and in the Handler collection of papers at Columbia Law School library.
33 See THURMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL 30-35 (1965) (discussing local legal
practice and service in Wyoming state legislature).
34 For a discussion of the realist members of the Yale Law School faculty with similar
interests in government regulation, see id. at 67-68. See also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986) (focusing on the impact of legal realism upon legal education at
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Arnold's seminal academic works are The Symbols of Gov-
ernments,35 and in particular The Folklore of Capitalism,36 in
which Arnold ridiculed the antitrust laws as empty symbolic vehi-
cles designed to assuage popular fears of bigness and power with-
out actually constraining the behavior of the modem business cor-
poration. This body of work did not deter President Roosevelt in
1938 from appointing Arnold as the head of the Antitrust Division,
nor Arnold from accepting the position.
As head of the Antitrust Division, Arnold presided over an
unprecedented expansion of the staff, budget, prestige, and influ-
ence of the Antitrust Division from a backwater of the New Deal
to one of the most prominent features of the Roosevelt post-New
Deal agenda. In so doing, Arnold introduced economics and
economists into the structure of the Division and forced the law-
yers "to think of antitrust enforcement in objective, systematic,
economic terms.,, 37 Arnold helped create a well-funded Antitrust
Division of both lawyers and economists that continues to this day
to enjoy a reputation as politically neutral, but expert, law enforc-
ers, with broad bipartisan support for its mission of criminal and
civil antitrust enforcement.38
In 1943, Arnold was appointed as a judge for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. After slightly more
than two years, Arnold left the bench 39 to make his next lasting
contribution to the development of antitrust as a discipline. In
1945, Arnold formed the law firm now known as Arnold & Porter
with his friends and fellow New Dealers Paul Porter and Abe For-
tas. Together they helped build not only one of the great antitrust
Yale); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLE\VELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (presenting
a biographical treatment of Karl Llewellyn as a legal realist). Interestingly, Milton Handler saw
himself as part of the Realist tradition at Columbia, but regretted that he was unable to utilize
this approach more explicitly in his antitrust writings. See Posner Letter, supra note 27.
35 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
36 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937). Arnold's later work was
more a response to critics of his administration as head of the Antitrust Division rather than a
continuation of his earlier academic work on the subject. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE
BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940).
37 SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 30 (1977).
38 For a more extended analysis of Arnold's accomplishment at the Antitrust Division and
an analysis of whether that reputation as law enforcers, rather than regulators, is valid, see
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998).
39 For a brief discussion of Arnold's experiences on the bench that conveys his unhappi-
ness in that role, see ARNOLD, supra note 33, at 156-59.
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firms, but one of the great Washington, D.C. law firms, designed
to represent parties in disputes over the meaning of government
regulation, but also to influence that regulation from its incep-
40tion.
These are just a few of the events and people that shaped the
story that began in the 1920s and ended by the middle of the 1950s
in which antitrust separated itself from the great undifferentiated
mass of corporate and business law and found itself as a separate
and well-defined discipline with specialized courses, publications,
career paths in both the public and private sector, and a separate
discourse that both unified those within the discipline and ex-
cluded or co-opted those outside it.
II. THE BIRTH OF A LEGAI/ECONOMIC DISCOURSE FOR ANTITRUST
The [antitrust] community consists of present and
former policymakers from the FTC, the Antitrust Di-
vision and other government agencies, prominent
members of the antitrust bar, and industrial organiza-
tional economists. Through their ongoing intellectual
interaction they structure the way in which policy and
administration are understood, problems analyzed,
and solutions constructed.41
This section examines how and why antitrust adopted the dis-
course that it did-that of economics as its primary analytical tool
over the last sixty years. While there have been raging debates
over what brand of economics constitutes the appropriate dis-
course, and the legal consequences of which tools are used, there
has been relatively little attention paid to competing business dis-
courses which have operated at the margins of antitrust since its
inception.
A. The Textual Era
It is frequently noted that the Sherman Act was passed the
same year that Alfred Marshall published his seminal textbook on
neoclassical economics.42 Marshall's work was not a factor in the
cursory debate about the final version of the Sherman Act nor the
40 See id. at 188-95, 204 (describing the rise of the law firm Arnold, Fortas & Porter).
41 EISNER, supra note 30, at 34.
42 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME (1890).
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more extensive debate on the prior version of the bill.43 What ac-
tually motivated the members of Congress that enacted the
Sherman Act has created one of the great academic cottage indus-
tries with distinguished commentators taking a wide range of posi-
tions.44 As Herbert Hovenkamp notes:
When the Sherman Act was first passed in 1890, most
(but not all) economists condemned it as at best irrelevant
to the problem of the trusts and at worst as harmful to the
economy because the statute would prohibit firms from
combining to take advantage of economies of scale made
possible by recent technological development. During
this period, roughly 1890-1930, American economists de-
veloped a set of theories that found consumer benefits in
concentration and large firms probably to a greater extent
than did any economic model until the rise of the Chicago
School.45
Regardless of which position one takes regarding this unsolv-
able question of legislative intent shrouded in history, there is no
evidence that the courts or the enforcers looked outside the lan-
guage of the law to resolve the textual ambiguities of the broad
formulations adopted by Congress in sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act in prohibiting "every contract, combination . . or
conspiracy" in "restraint of trade or commerce", or in prohibiting
43 See 1 EARL M. KIqrNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 7-23 (1978) (discussing the legislative history surrounding the
subsequently amended Senate version of the bill that later became the Sherman Act); PERnz,
supra note 4, at 13-26.
" There are at least six different positions commonly asserted as to the motivating spirit
and purpose of the Sherman Act. See Spencer Weber Waller, Market Talk: Competition Policy
in America, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 436-38 (1997) (book review). For a jurisprudential
and rhetorical analysis of the debates leading up to the enactment of Sherman Act, see PaRrmz,
supra note 4, at 9-26.
45 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L REV. 213, 220 (1985)
(footnotes omitted). See also William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century
of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., winter 2000, at 43, 44 (stating that "most
economists scorned the Sherman Act" and that it was not thought of as being a useful method of
controlling abusive business conduct). It is doubly ironic that Hovenkamp suggests the exis-
tence of a nineteenth century Chicago school with similar views to its successor in the 1960s
and beyond, and that one of the few economists supporting antitrust enforcement in the early
part of the nineteenth century was Herbert Simons, a faculty member at the University of Chi-
cago. See CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS 5 (1900) (collecting speeches, debates, and reso-
lutions of delegates attending an 1899 conference on trusts and trade combinations, sponsored
by the Civic Federation of Chicago); Kovacic & Shapiro, supra, at 49 ("Simons in particular
assailed the statist assumptions of New Deal planning experiments such as NIRA and advocated
robust antitrust enforcement ... ").
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those who "monopolize or attempt to monopolize or conspire with
any other person to monopolize." Early Supreme Court cases fo-
cused on either the constitutionality of the Act or the meaning of
interstate commerce,4 6 or engaged in a bitter interpretative struggle
over the relationship of the Sherman Act to the prior common law
of restraint of trade and the need to adopt or avoid a "rule of rea-
son."
47
The debate over the need for a rule of reason was resolved
doctrinally in the 1911 Standard Oil Co. v. United States48 deci-
sion, which held that the Sherman Act prohibited only those
agreements that unreasonably restricted competition. The Court
then moved on to amplify the meaning of the rule of reason49 and
struggle with the question of whether there were categories of
agreements, which were so inevitably anticompetitive that they
could be deemed per se unreasonable. Cases like Trenton Potter-
ies suggested that certain categories of price fixing were indeed
per se violations of the antitrust laws. 50  Cases. like the Supreme
Court's Appalachian Coals v. United States51 suggested to the con-
trary, but were read as aberrations of the Great Depression. It was
not until 1940 that the Supreme Court appeared to have resolved
46 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (finding that the defen-
dants' conduct was commerce among the states as contemplated in the Sherman Act); N. Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (affirming and holding that the Sherman Act is a valid
exercise of Congressional authority); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (holding
that a combination of commission merchants at stock yards is not subject to the Sherman Act
since their business is not interstate commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895) (holding that manufacturing alone is not encompassed by the Sherman Act's definition
of interstate commerce).
47 See, e.g., N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 410 (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("A partnership is not a
contract or combination in restraint of trade between the partners unless the well known words
are to be given a new meaning invented for the purposes of this act."); Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (affirming then Circuit Judge William Howard Taft's
more famous opinion at 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)) (detailing the history the common law doc-
trine of restraint of trade); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (holding
that the defendant violated the Sherman Act by creating an association of competing trunk line
systems that established and maintained rates and fares); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (holding that all combinations in restraint of trade or com-
merce are prohibited, whether in the form of trust or in any other form).
48
221 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911).
49 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (holding that
legality depends on whether the restraint imposed merely regulates or promotes competition, or
whether it may suppress or destroy competition).
50 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (stating that
"[a]greements . .. may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints,
without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable
as fixed").
51 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) (holding that joint sales agreement not per se unlawful).
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this issue in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 52 in holding
that all price fixing agreements were per se violations of the anti-
trust laws.
During this textual era neither economic theory nor business
theory played a dominant role in the Supreme Court's resolution of
the issues of the day, but each occasionally entered the picture.
53
After Standard Oil, the business community turned to a variety of
business theories that offered business leaders a seeming opportu-
nity to stay one step ahead of the evolving antitrust law and en-
forcement policy. Some were attempts to circumvent rules against
price-fixing through the open exchange between competitors of
sensitive competitive information about present and future prices,
sales, and customers.54 The more brazen schemes were stricken
down,55 while more competitively neutral information exchanges
were approved and lent judicial approval to the growing trade as-
52 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The category of agreements constituting per se agreements has
grown and contracted over the years. Forty years afterwards, the Suprene Court began to
question the wisdom of treating all agreements relating to price as per se unreasonable and
began to analyze certain agreements between competitors related to price under the full rule of
reason or variously formulated middle standards. See FIC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986) (analyzing the refusal of a federation of dentists to supply dental x-rays to
insurance companies for use in benefits determinations under the rule of reason); NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (adopting the rule of reason rather than a per se rule when
analyzing an NCAA plan limiting the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games);
Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (reversing a 2nd Circuit decision
that utilized the per se rule to invalidate licenses, and remanding the case for an assessment
under the rule of reason); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (explaining that whether a practice is analyzed under the per se rule or the rule of reason,
"the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint"). The Court continues to struggle with whether to view the relationship between per
se and full rule of reason cases as dichotomous choices or a sliding scale and how to select the
proper standard in a particular case. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770-71
(1999) (holding that the decision between a "quick-look" analysis and the rule of reason is to be
determined by the obviousness of the anticompetitive effects). See generally Stephen Calkins,
California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTrRuST LJ.
495, 531-33 (2000) (analyzing the Court's decision and characterizing the opinion as a setback
for the "quick-look" movement).
53 For example, the Supreme Court first cited an economist in 1925 in United Maple
Flooring Manufacturing Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 583 n.1 (1925) (pointing
readers to economists' analyses of the "Competitive System" in "Marshall's Readings on Indus-
trial Society," referring to Hobson's "The Evolution of Modem Capitalism," and to Irving
Fischer's "Elementary Principles of Economics"). See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 45, at 47
("Maple Flooring holds special interest for economists today because it featured the Supreme
Court's first citation to an economist's work in an antitrust decision ....").
54 See ARTHUR EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 123-56 (1915) (sanctioning the use of
"Open-Price Associations" to avoid antitrust violations).
55 See Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410-11 (1921) (refer-
ring to the "Open Competition Plan" between hardwood manufacturers as "skillfully devised to
evade the law").
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sociation movement of the times. 56 If anything, business theory
was used by corporate America to either justify its behavior when
challenged or to support the de facto repeal of antitrust when gov-
ernment-business cooperation was needed during World War I and
the Great Depression.57
During this same era, both economic as well as business dis-
course exerted competing influences on the antitrust legislative
agenda of the early part of the twentieth century, but neither pro-
vided much analytical heft to either plaintiffs or defendants in the
cases that followed. While the 1914 Clayton Act contained lan-
guage directing courts to focus on the likely effects on "competi-
tion," economic theory of the times provided little help to the
courts in making this determination.
In contrast, the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act sought to
create a new administrative body expert in the ways of business to
determine and separate out "unfair methods of competition" from
normal business behavior. Contemporary business theory did not
provide the tools to undertake this task and a combination of bu-
reaucratic inactivity and hostility from the courts left the FTC a
secondary player in antitrust enforcement during this era.58
B. The Rise of Economic Discourse
Two factors led to the subsequent rise of economic discourse
as the predominant discourse of antitrust. The first was the utter
discrediting of business thinking in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion. The Great Depression was the critical event for virtually
everyone alive during this period. Apart from the devastating ma-
terial effects on the lives and fortunes of millions, the Great De-
pression also was the preeminent intellectual influence on a gen-
eration of intellectuals and public policy makers who rejected the
old tools which had failed the nation and embraced and sought
56 See Maple Flooring Mfg. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925) (upholding
a trade association plan that exchanged price and consumer information).
57 See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM, NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION
AND WAR 120-23 (1995) (documenting the difficulties encountered by New Dealers in enforc-
ing the antitrust laws); EISNER, supra note 30, at 64.
58 For example, one of the many periods of relative inactivity occurred in the late 1920s
and early 1930s under the chairmanship of William Humphrey who wanted to align the FTC
more closely with the needs of the business community. See EISNER, supra note 30, at 65.
President Roosevelt's efforts to fire Humphrey in order to promote a more activist commission
resulted in the constitutional landmark case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935). The many ups and downs in the activity and status of the FrC are discussed in
EISNER, supra note 30, at 59-75, 150-83, 210-25.
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new tools and a new role for government to undo the carnage that
had been wrought.59  As Thurman Arnold, among many others,
noted: "The public discovered that 'sound' business thinking had
been mostly superstition. 60
To fill this void, economic theory and discourse developed
that allowed a more vigorous role for government in economic
matters and a new vitality for antitrust, where prior to that time
mainstream economic theory had little to offer a serious antitrust
enforcer.61 Around the time that John Maynard Keynes was sup-
plying the macroeconomic tools for governments to adjust budg-
ets, taxes, and spending to deal with the Great Depression,62 two
other prominent English economists were supplying the micro-
economic tools to reinvigorate antitrust theory and enforcement.
Edward Chamberlin's theory of monopolistic competition,63
and to a lesser extent Joan Robinson's theory of imperfect compe-
tition, 64 provided a viable alternative to the neoclassical theories
that had unproductively focused on either perfect competition or
true monopoly as the only attributes of markets. The work of
Chamberlin and Robinson became the inspiration for a generation
of industrial organization economists who created a paradigm
based on structure-conduct-performance ("SCP") that dominated
antitrust enforcement for next generation.65
59 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A LIFE tN OUR TIMES: MEMOIRSpassim (1981).
ARNOLD, supra note 33, at 38. In contrast, the corporate bar remains more closely
connected to, and conversant with, the business literature, particularly in the corporate finance
area. See Peter Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Lav and Finance
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L, REV. 175 (2000).
61 Even as late as 1938, Thurman Arnold felt that there was very little support among
economists for the proposition that antitrust enforcement was an important economic policy.
See ARNOLD, supra note 33, at 113 ("I believed that my principal function was to convince
American businessmen that the Sherman Act represented something more than a pious plati-
tude; second, that its enforcement was an important economic policy. But there was very little
support among economists for the latter notion."). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust
Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEx. L. REv. 105, 145 (1989) (stating
that many "economists who accepted the classical theory of competition" did not support anti-
trust enforcement because they believed "trusts could have only beneficial consequences, not
harmful ones"); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics and the Courts, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 187, 187 (discussing Supreme Court antitrust opinions
adopting an economic analytical framework).
62JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936).
63 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956)
(1933).
64 JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
65 But see HAROLD FLEMING, TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: A STORY OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 180-83 (1958) (attributing renewed antitrust enforcement in 1930s to the
influence of Thorstein Veblen's theories).
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The SCP paradigm held that "concentrated industrial struc-
tures promote anticompetitive forms of conduct which affect the
performance of the economy." 66 From this premise flowed several
highly generalized conclusions:
* Concentrated industrial structures create an inflation-
ary bias;
* Large firms in concentrated industries may be rela-
tively inefficient;
* High levels of concentration place limits on techno-
logical innovation;
o High levels of concentration promoted product differ-
entiation and reduced price competition;
o High levels of concentration exacerbated maldistribu-
tion of wealth through transfers from consumers to
producers.6a
The principal texts of the SCP paradigm include: JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW
COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1956) [hereinafter BAIN, BARRIERS]; JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION]; CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY
CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956); EDWARD S. MASON,
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957); REPORT, supra note 15;
J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940). See
also Frederick Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusion of Models: The Faustian Pact
of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984) (describing SCP paradigm and critiquing
fusion of law and economics as providing false promise of certainty as model for interpretation
of business behavior).
For one of the purest application of the SCP paradigm in government antitrust enforce-
ment policy, see the 1968 Merger Guidelines issued by the Antitrust Division during the tenure
of Donald Turner as Assistant Attorney General. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES
(1968) reprinted in Merger Guidelines (1968), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101, at 20,521
(Mar. 18, 1998). See also EISNER, supra note 30, at 129 (establishing market concentration
thresholds derived from the SCP paradigm to determine the legality of a horizontal merger).
Like the types of economic discourses that both preceded and followed the SCP paradigm,
this discourse lost much of its influence but did not disappear when it was replaced as the domi-
nant discourse of the discipline. Current prominent advocates of this form of industrial organi-
zation economics include G. William Shepherd and F. Michael Scherer. See F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 5 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that
the field of industrial organization analyzes the relationships involving a causal flow from
market structure to conduct and performance); WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES
TOWARD BUSINESS 24-25 (7th ed. 1985) (describing industry structure, behavior and perform-
ance in an analysis of competition and market power).
66 EISNER, supra note 30, at 100. See also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note
65, at 120 (noting that "as sellers are progressively fewer in number, it becomes progressively
easier for them to arrive at and sustain express and tacit agreements to pursue joint profit-
maximizing price and output policies").
67 EISNER, supra note 30, at 101-03 (noting that structure and conduct analysis leads to the
above-mentioned performance-related generalizations).
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The SCP approach came closest to reintroducing certain as-
pects of business discourse back into antitrust enforcement. Joe
Bain's notion of entry barriers and the need for highly empirical
industry and firm studies was a gateway to this discourse had ei-
ther lawyers or economists been interested in pursuing this path.68
While this type of discourse is no longer dominant in the antitrust
world, it remains a staple of the strategic planning exercises
through which business managers today seek to achieve sustain-
able competitive advantage.69
Neither the economists nor the lawyers dominating antitrust
discourse were inclined to proceed in this direction. The econo-
mists studied these topics in technical industrial organization jar-
gon and the lawyers and courts used these tools as a justification
for the spread of per se rules which prohibited an increasing num-
ber of collaborative and distribution practices based on increas-
ingly specious economic assumptions or equally dubious infer-
ences from limited statistical or market data.
6S See BAIN, BARRIERS, supra note 65, at 3-4 (finding that conditions of market entry may
be an important determinant of market behavior based on a study of twenty manufacturing
industries).
69 See infra notes 123-58 and accompanying text. Studying modem business texts often
provides an eerie sense of deja vu in recreating the discourse of key aspects of the SCP tradition.
See e.g., DAVID A. AAKER, STRATEGIC MARKET MANAGEMENT 78-97 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinaf-
ter AAKER, STRATEGIC MARKEr MANAGEMENT] (analyzing market profitability by the intensity
of competition among actual competitors, the threat of potential competition, and bargaining
strengths of consumers and suppliers); DAVID J. COLLIS & CYNTHIA A. MONTGOMERY,
CORPORATE STRATEGY: RESOURCES AND THE SCOPE OF THE FIRM 25-47 (1997) (strategy as
means of achieving sustainable economic rents); ROBERT M. GRANT, CONTEMPORARY
STRATEGY ANALYSIS 54, 62 (2d ed. 1995) (describing barriers to entry when conducting a
market analysis); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETrivE ADVANTAGE xvi (1985) (detailing the
means by which a firm can put generic strategies into practice in order to gain a competitive
advantage over competitors); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR
ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 7-17 (1980) (describing how new market partici-
pants should analyze their strengths and weaknesses to create or overcome barriers to entry);
MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION 56-73 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of "fit"
between product, distribution, and marketing strategy as part of an overall strategy for sustain-
able competitive advantage).
70 In addition to strictly enforcing the previously established per se prohibitions against
horizontal price fixing and minimum resale price maintenance, courts in the dominant era of the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm established new per se prohibitions against tying in
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), group boycotts in Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), maximum resale price maintenance in
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), and vertical territorial restrictions in United States
v. Arnold, Schivinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In addition, Clayton Act provisions regarding
exclusive dealing were interpreted broadly in Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Sta-
tions), 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the antimerger provisions
of the Clayton Act were interpreted to bar any quantitatively significant mergers in markets with
increasing concentration in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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The intellectual sterility of this approach, changes in the econ-
omy, and a growing sense that the only unifying theme in antitrust
enforcement was that the government (or plaintiff) always won,7 '
led to two different counter-revolutions. One group of critics led
by Milton Handler and Betty Bock, an economist, argued for the
need for more empirical and case-by-case analysis before con-
demning particular practices or deciding individual cases.7 z The
other more dominant wing was the theoretical revolution of the
Chicago school, which relied on the teaching of economic theory,
rather than business theory, to achieve results quite congenial to
the business community.
C. The Discourse Flips: The Rise of the Law and Economics
Movement
The rise of the Chicago school of antitrust analysis and its ten-
ets has been frequently discussed.73 All accounts point to the criti-
cal role of Aaron Director who, as a teacher at the University of
Chicago, but not a scholar, formulated the principal ideas of the
movement by examining the principal questions of antitrust
71 See Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sole consistency
that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins.").
72 See BErrY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
LAW (2d ed. 1962) (1960) (noting the absence of concrete data available in a study of mergers
and acquisitions); MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957) (arguing against per
se rules of analysis and for a rule of reason approach where all the relevant data are weighed);
Milton Handler, Where Do We Go from Here - An Overview, in ANTITRUST IN TRANSITION
(1991) (advocating an approach applied on a case-by-case basis in light of special and peculiar
facts of each industry, market conditions, and the regulatory goals in each market); Betty Bock,
An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 117 (1985) (advocating for a
uniform theory for vertical restraints analysis); Betty Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evi-
dence in Merger Cases: Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1965)
(noting that economic experts in antitrust cases must develop economic facts and criteria that
will be acceptable legal evidence); Betty Bock, The Shifting Vocabulary of Antitrust-Legal
Linguistics in a Period of Change, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 326 (1985) (describing the relativ-
ity of antitrust concepts which can result in dramatic shifts in enforcement policy). See also
William E. Kovacic, Creating Competition Policy: Betty Bock and the Development of Antitrust
hIstitutions, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 235-36 (1997) (describing Bock's contribution to antitrust
economics, noting her disapproval of structural tests and bright-line rules that fail to measure
efficiency, consumer-responsiveness, technology, and the firm's life-cycle).
73
The history of the movement is summarized in Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet
in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REV. 705, 707-08 (1982) (describing the Chicago school leaders'
use of economic theory to debunk assumptions about predatory conduct, vertical arrangements
and restricted distribution). For a less sympathetic account which also attributes a greater influ-
ence to the ideas of Ronald Coase see PERrz, supra note 4, at 236-45, 258-62 (noting that
Coase's article, The Theory of Social Cost, greatly influenced the Chicago School's antitrust
policies, which include the promotion of liberty of contract and limited government intervention
in the market).
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through the lens of price theory.74 Director's largely unpublished
ideas75 were elaborated on by key students and colleagues such as
Ward Bowman, John McGee, Robert Bork, and Lester Telser.76
Subsequent scholars such as George Stigler77 and Richard Posner
78
further elaborated ideas flowing from analyses of specific antitrust
issues so that the common elements of a school could be discerned.
The basic assumptions of the Chicago school are: "(1) the best
policy tool currently available for maximizing economic .efficiency
in the real world is the neoclassical price theory model; and (2) the
pursuit of economic efficiency should be the exclusive goal of an-
titrust enforcement policy. ' 79 Its key tenets can be summarized as:
0 Economic efficiency, the pursuit of which should be the ex-
clusive goal of the antitrust laws, consists of two relevant
parts: allocative efficiency and productive efficiency .... A
properly defined antitrust policy will attempt to maximize net
efficiency gains.
74 See Posner, supra note 73, at 928 ("I believe Director's conclusions resulted simply
from viewing antitrust policy through the lens of price theory."). But see FLEMING, supra note
65 (pre-Chicago school critique of antitrust by business journalist condemning contemporary
antitrust policy as to hard competition, price discrimination, monopolization, vertical integra-
tion, and distributional practices).
75 But see Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51
Nw. U. L REv. 281, 282 (1956) (arguing that general economic principles do not justify the
application of antitrust laws to many of the situations in which the laws were currently being
applied).
76 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 145 (1978) (describing Professor
Director's hypothesis that monopolists would rather merge than use predatory conduct which
later expanded to debunk the theory that Standard Oil's conduct was predatory); JOHN S.
McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 132-37 (1971) (questioning studies
attempting to correlate industrial concentration with inefficient market performance and the
ability of antitrust laws to promote efficiency and cooperation); Robert Bork, Vertical Integra-
tion and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHL L.
REv. 157, 194, 196 n.129 (1954) (citing Professor Director's theory of tying as a counting
device for price discrimination); Ward Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J 19, 19-20 (1957) (elaborating on Professor Director's theories that product
tying could be either an evasion of price regulation or a counting device for price discrimina-
tion); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137,
138 n.2 (1958) (crediting Professor Director for encouraging the author's study of Standard Oil
Co. and predatory pricing); Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 86, 86 (1960) (crediting Professor Director for a study on manufacturer support for
resale price maintenance).
See GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968) (collecting his seminal
articles challenging then conventional industrial organizational theory).
78 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976)
(arguing that antitrust law and remedies should correspond to economic theory and should be
used neither where competition is less efficient than monopoly nor where the object is to
achieve non-efficiency-related goals, such as protection of small businesses).
79 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 226.
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* Most markets are competitive even if they contain a relatively
small number of sellers.
* Monopoly, when it exists, tends to be self-correcting.
* "Natural" barriers to entry are more imagined than real.
" Economies of scale are far more pervasive than economists
once believed.
* Business firms are profit maximizers.
" Antitrust enforcement should be designed in such a way as to
penalize conduct precisely to the point that it is inefficient,
but to tolerate or encourage it when it is efficient. The deci-
sion to make the neoclassical market efficiency model the ex-
clusive guide for antitrust policy is nonpolitical. °
As Richard Posner has noted even more succinctly: "By 1969,
then, an orthodox Chicago position (well represented in the writ-
ings of Robert Bork) had crystallized: only explicit price fixing
and very large horizontal mergers (mergers to monopoly) were
worthy of serious concern."8'
The influence of the Chicago version of the law and econom-
ics movement grew, and even gained converts from prominent
adherents to the old paradigm, 82 despite cogent criticism from both
within the economics profession 83 and from those who disagreed
with either the assumptions or values espoused by the Chicago
sO See EISNER, supra note 30, at 103-07.
81 Posner, supra note 73, at 933.
Key Chicago school figures such as William Baxter and George Stigler had at one time
taken positions more aligned with the older SCP paradigm. In addition, key SCP adherents such
as Donald Turner and Leonard Weiss muted or modified their positions on key issues to ac-
commodate the growing influence of the Chicago school. See EISNER, supra note 30, at 109-10
& n.40, 126; Posner, supra note 73, at 944 (arguing for convergence of so-called Harvard and
Chicago schools of analysis).
83 See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis
in our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Critique Approach to the Study of Law
and Economics, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 950, 953 (criticizing the Chicago school's emphasis on
allocative efficiency at the expense of income redistribution goals); Richard S. Markovits, A
Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of "The Effect of a
Choice on Allocative Efficiency": Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtu-
ally All Law & Economics Welfare Arguments are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 485,485 (criti-
cizing the economists' definition of a choice on allocative efficiency as tending to preserve the
status quo); Richard S. Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws'
Economic Tests of Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 841, 844-50 (1975) (arguing that antitrust eco-
nomic tests, including the actual price/actual marginal cost of product test, are ambiguous,
arbitrary, or non-comprehensive); Richard S. Markovits, Economists and Self-Deception: A
Critique of Law & Economics Scholarship and Scholars (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 255-60 (approving of Chicago school
analysis, but noting that the neoclassical efficiency model cannot predict the consequences of
real world behavior).
[Vol. 52:283
2001] THE LANGUAGE OF LAWAND THE LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS 3U3
school. 84 It reached its high point in terms of antitrust enforcement
policy during the Reagan administration with the appointment of
prominent Chicago school scholars and followers as heads of both
the Antitrust Division85 and the FTC 86 as well as the appointment
of many leaders of the Chicago school to the federal appellate
87courts. The Chicago school became the orthodoxy being spreadin numerous courts, law schools, and ongoing symposia.88
84 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REv. 917,
918 (1987) [hereinafter Fox, Battle] (highlighting the benefits of the "New Coalition" school of
antitrust analysis, advocated by Professor Sullivan, which takes into account real world evi-
dence and history over the Chicago school approach); Eleanor M. Fox, Consumers Beware
Chicago, 84 MICH. L, REv. 1714, 1718 (1986) [hereinafter Fox,'Beware Chicago] (arguing that
the Chicago school's worldview would defeat antitrust law altogether); Eleanor M. Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1981) [here-
inafter Fox, New Equilirium] (redefining the antitrust goal of efficiency to mean protecting
consumer interests through competition and encouraging "smallness for its own sake"); Robert
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65, 69-70 (1982) (opining that Congress passed
the antitrust laws to advance the goal of wealth redistribution by preventing unfair acquisition of
consumer wealth by firms with market power); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The
No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEo. L. 1487, 1488 (1983)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's per se rule towards vertical price-fixing arrangements is
justified because minimum vertical price-fixing leads to higher resale prices); Robert Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing that antitrust
analysis should include relevant political concerns, including a desire to enhance individual and
business freedom by discouraging concentration of power and a concern whether economic
theory alone will reduce concentration); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanis-
tic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1214
(1979) (arguing that economic theory has limited application and that antitrust legal scholarship
should incorporate the teachings of other disciplines, including history, philosophy, and the
social sciences).
5 William Baxter was a prominent law and economics antitrust scholar at Stanford Law
School and a vigorous advocate of the Chicago school prior to his appointment, although he was
a convert from the earlier dominant Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm. See supra note
82.
James Miller was an economist sympathetic to Chicago school economics. He received
his Ph.D from the University of Virginia, and prior to his appointment as chairman of the FIC
had served in prominent economic policy positions under the Ford administration and had been
a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He was the first economist to serve on
the Commission itself and the first non-lawyer in thirty years. See EISNER, supra note 30, at
213 (discussing James Miller's goal to fully integrate law and economics into antitrust policy
during his tenure as chairman of the FTC).
87 These appointments included Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook to the Seventh
Circuit, Ralph Winter to the Second Circuit, and Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg to the D.C.
Circuit. Both Bork and Ginsburg were subsequently unsuccessfully nominated for the United
States Supreme Court as well.
88 For example, Henry Manne, the former dean of the George Mason University Law
School, organized an ongoing series of law and economics symposia to train law professors,
judges, and policy makers in this discourse. See Symposium, The Legacy of Henry G. Manne:
Pioneer in Law and Economics and Innovator in Legal Education, 50 CASE W. RES. L REV.
203-466 (1999) (celebrating the whole of Henry Manne's contribution to scholarship and to
education). See also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 45, at 58 (noting institutional entrenchment
of law and economics movement in law schools, the judiciary, and government agencies).
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Much of the impact of this flip in the discourse would not
have occurred but for institutional changes in the organization of
both the Antitrust Division and the FTC that occurred prior to the
Reagan Administration. During the period roughly from 1960 to
1980 for the Antitrust Division, and from 1970 to 1980 at the FTC,
the influence of economists within these organizations was greatly
enhanced. As Professor Marc Eisner and others have discussed,
both agencies dramatically upgraded the resources and prestige
associated with the role of economists. 89 The particular economic
theories associated with the Chicago school could thus take root so
thoroughly and quickly within the agencies because economic the-
ory and economists already had established an institutional pres-
ence and had been integrated into the policy process. 90
D. Post-Chicago: It's Still the Economics that Matters
Despite the dominance of the Chicago school model, particu-
larly on the enforcement decisions of the Reagan administration,
undercurrents of other discourses still remained in the mix. Re-
gardless of the eclecticism of these voices, and the growing
strength of the post-Chicago movements, the debate remained
whether, and what types of, economics should be used without
much thought as to what business theory could add to the mix.91
The dominant discourse to emerge to contest the Chicago school
paradigm has been dubbed the post-Chicago school. Beginning in
the mid-1980s, a group of lawyers and economists began to advo-
cate what they considered a new brand of analysis, which was eco-
nomic in nature but more empirical, less static, less reductivist,
and more sympathetic to enforcement actions by both government
and private plaintiffs.92
During this period there is no known equivalent effort espousing either an alternative economic,
or non-economic, view of antitrust.
89 See EISNER, supra note 30, at 15-18; WEAVER, supra note 37, at 130-36 (discussing
upgrading of economics in Division during the leadership of Donald Turner and the resentful
reaction of legal staff).
90 See EISNER, supra note 30, at 18, 184-227 (describing the integration of economics into
the structure and policy of the antitrust agencies which was partially responsible for the conser-
vative enforcement agenda in the 1980s). For example, the FTC stopped bringing vertical re-
straint cases in 1979, prior to the election of President Reagan. Id. at 223.
91 This was unfortunate, but perhaps, inevitable given the strong association between the
Chicago school prescriptions, classical notions of laissez faire, and the interests of the business
community.
92 The early wave of the post-Chicago scholarship relating to raising rivals costs is sum-
marized and discussed in Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 274-80. Later symposia both describ-
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Prominent voices in the post-Chicago school have included
Steven Salop who has pioneered on his own, and with others, the
theory of raising rivals' costs that has proved influential in both
the literature and agency enforcement policy in recent years.
93
Oliver Williamson has focused on various forms of strategic be-
havior that the Chicago school ignored as either efficient or com-
petitively benign. 94  A variety of other commentators have rein-
ing and debating branches of the post-Chicago thinking can be found in Course Materials, Post-
Chicago Economics: New Theories, New Cases (Georgetown University Law Center 1994);
Symposium on Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J 445-695 (1995); Symposium on
Post-Chicago Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1-191 (1989). See also Robert Prentice, Va-
porware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World,
57 OHio ST. L.J. 1163, 1167 (1996) (arguing that the technology industry's use of a product pre-
announcement where manufacturers have no reasonable belief the product will be available by
the date advertised is a potential section 2 violation); Thomas C. Wilcox, Behavioral Remedies
in a Post-Chicago World: It's Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines, 40 ANTITRUST
BuLL 227, 227 (1995) (noting that recent consent decrees have alleged various types of dis-
crimination and abuse of confidential information as potentially anticompetitive practices which
should be incorporated into the merger guidelines).
93 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986) (suggesting a unified
standard to assess exclusionary conduct, including raising rivals' costs); Thomas G. Kratten-
maker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 263-64
(1987) (arguing that the presence of either of the two types of anticompetitive economic power,
raising one's own prices and raising competitors' costs, should suffice for a violation); Michael
H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTrrRusT L.. 513, 519 (1995) (noting that vertical mergers may be anticompetitive because
they raise rivals' costs); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Vertical Restraints: Has Economics
Mattered?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 168, 168 (1992) (special issue) (describing the general accep-
tance of economic theory among judges, but noting that courts often restrict their engagement
with the theories and as a result the legal conclusions drawn are overbroad); Steven C. Salop,
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak; and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68
ANTITRusT L.J. 187, 187-88 (2000) (analyzing the Kodak decision based on the competitive
effects of the conduct at issue); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267 (1983) (special issue) (opining that exclusionary practices, scale
economies, and entry barriers may be more effective and more dangerous than predatory pric-
ing); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 335 (1979) (special
issue) (analyzing strategic barriers to entry that result from a fundamental asymmetry between
an established firm and potential entrant).
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 258-61 (1975) (analyzing vertical integration, conglomeration,
dominant firms and oligopoly under a theory of organizational hierarchies); Oliver E. William-
son, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going, 27 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 289, 314
(1983) (describing unresolved strategic firm behavior issues, including identifying a firm's
incentives to engage in predation); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hos-
tages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 536-37 (1983) (explaining that some non-
standard contracting practices should not be assumed to produce efficiencies); Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 286 (1977)
(describing an analytical model of strategic motivations of firms to engage in predatory pricing).
Williamson is a complicated scholar to analyze in terms of a Chicago/post-Chicago dichotomy
since important portions of his work support key insights of the Chicago school about the value
and role of efficiency in antitrust. See Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 177, 203 (1985) (efficiency purposes sometimes served by both restraint of trade and
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vigorated antitrust economics with a renewed focus on the applica-
tion of game theory to analyze when certain predatory practices
are both rational and likely to injure competition. 95  Jonathan
Baker, Timothy Bresnahan, Daniel Rubinfield, and others have
introduced a new empiricism which has focused on the unilateral
effects of mergers and acquisitions and hold forth the possibility of
the routine use of viable empirical tools to directly find and meas-
ure market power without the need for the old surrogates of defin-
ing shares of a relevant market.
96
At the same time, a group of eclectic voices have focused on
non-economic concerns that also achieved greater prominence in
the post-Chicago space. These voices include overlapping mem-
monopoly). Posner has acknowledged the complicated relationship between Williamson's work
and that of the Chicago school noting both his insights about strategic behavior revealing a
fundamental weakness in the orthodox Chicago school analysis and Williamson's reliance in his
work on transaction costs on the work of Ronald Coase, a key Chicago school founder. See
Posner, supra note 73, at 939-40 & n.68.
95 See Dennis W. Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and
Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 425 (1997) (noting that game theory is used to analyze
how communication may affect market outcomes); John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 42,
44-45 (1980) (applying game theory to analyze incentives resulting from a theoretical right of
contribution for antitrust defendants); Joseph Kattan & William R. Vigdor, Game Theory and
the Analysis of Collusion in Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 441, 453
(1997) (arguing that firm behavior which enhances the "likelihood of an anticompetitive out-
come is also fully consistent with rigorous competition"); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Game Theory
and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 411, 411 (1997) (predicting that game
theory's role in clarifying the application of antitrust law will be minimal); Edmund H. Mantell,
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Supreme Court Antitrust Decision, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 233,
233-34 (1983) (applying game theory to the Supreme Court antitrust decision, Illinois Brick);
Carl Shapiro, The Theory of Business Strategy, 20 RAND J. ECON. 125, 125-30 (1989) (describ-
ing the use of game theory in the field of industrial organization to study business strategy);
Willard K. Tom, Game Theory in the Everyday Life of the Antitrust Practitioner, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 457, 458-64 (1997) (analyzing oligopolistic coordination, vertical and horizon-
tal mergers under game theory); Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the
Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 121 (1993) (opining that game
theory must be applied to oligopolistic practices with greater specificity).
96 Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV.
347, 347 (1997) (raising technical issues necessary to determine the competitive consequences
of mergers in differentiated product industries); Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in
FTC v. Staples, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKET. 11, 11 (1999) (discussing the FrC's use of pric-
ing studies to obtain an injunction against the merger); Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments
in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 646 (1989) (pre-
senting six new economic developments that limit or qualify Chicago school assumptions);
Jonathan B. Baker and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review
and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 386 (1999); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan,
Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 3 (1992)
(describing econometric measures of market power); Daniel L. Rubinfield, Market Definition in
Differentiated Products: The Post/Nabisco Cereal Merger, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 163, 163-64
(2000) (advocating for the increased use of empirical data in merger analysis).
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bers of a modern populist wing,97 a post-modern wing closely re-
lated to the critical legal studies movement, 98 a group of new his-
97 See Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago
Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" it. Restraint of Trade Analysis,
15 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1992) (arguing that the restraints of trade in Chicago Board of
Trade were reasonable because "they controlled risks of opportunistic behavior and so were
ancillary to a joint, productive venture" between the Board and traders); Peter C. Carstensen,
How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American Economy: Examining History or Theo-
rizing?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1175, 1217 (1989) [hereinafter Carstensen, Examining History] (argu-
ing that only "complex and specific history of industries" should be used to assess the economic
impact of antitrust enforcement); Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Bank Mergers: The
Case for Concern, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1989) (opining that interstate bank mergers
threaten increased consumer costs); Peter C. Carstensen, Restricting the Power to Promote
Competition in Banking: A Foolish Consistency Among the Circuits, 1983 DUKE L.J 580, 581
(arguing that the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits' requirement that regulators prove that a
merger's anticompetitive effects would make the combination unlawful is too strict); Peter C.
Carstensen, A Time to Return to Competition Goals in Banking Policy and Antitrust Enforce-
ment: A Memorandum to the Antitrust Division, 41 ANTrTRusT BULL. 489, 492 (1996) (arguing
that DOJ should resume rigorous scrutiny of horizontal bank mergers); Fox, Battle, supra note
84, at 918 (advocating for the "New Coalition" in antitrust analysis); Fox, Beware Chicago,
supra note 84, at 1718 (criticizing the Chicago school's narrow principals); Eleanor M. Fox,
Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 49, 51-52 (1980) (describing the recommendations of the National Commission
for the Review of the Antitrust Laws); Fox, New Equilibrium, supra note 84, at 1140 (describ-
ing antitrust goals of consumer and small business protection); Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of
Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
554, 554 (1986) (arguing that judges and scholars should be aware of the ideological bias in the
modem uses of law and economics); Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws
were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J 959, 961
(1999) (arguing from author's article, Wealth Transfers, that Congress' primary intent in pass-
ing the antitrust laws was to protect "consumers from paying more as a result of anticompetitive"
activity"); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) [hereinafter Lande,
Wealth Transfers], reprinted in Wealth Transfers, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999); Rudolph J.R.
Peritz, Some Realism About Economic Power in a Time of Sectorial Change, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
247, 252 (1997) (arguing that a company's size and its effects should be analyzed to derive
market power).
See PERrrz, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that competition policy and arguments are "con-
testable social and political choices" not resulting from historical, economic or logical neces-
sity); Arthur D. Austin, Antitrust Deconstructed, 22 STETSON L. REv. 1101, 1102-03 (1993)
(noting that antitrust has "been deconstructing itself since 1890," and using a deconstructionist
device juxtaposing privileged and marginal commentary from the antitrust scholarly community
with quotes from major antitrust cases); Arthur D. Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger
Wave: The Revolution vs. the Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931, 959-62 (1988) (arguing
that Chicago school economics, the growth of information technology and globalization will
render the antimerger doctrine of section 7 of the Clayton Act obsolete); Gary Minda, Antitrust
at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REv. 1759, 1781 (1995) (arguing that antitrust's continuing
relevance depends on its reinvention for post-industrial world markets); Gary Mfinda, The Com-
mon Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J 461, 461 (1989) (noting the modem trend
toward lax enforcement of antitrust laws and stringent enforcement of labor laws to the detri-
ment of organized labor); Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A
Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTNGS L.J. 905, 1028 (1990)
(arguing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine allows business interests to "use political expres-
sion as a predatory strategy for capturing the benefits of regulation"); Gary Minda, The Law and
Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 807, 812 (1993) (describing "boycott" as a "judicial
trope to condemn.. . expressive activity of different groups"); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, A Counter-
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toricists,99 and a group of comparative scholars focused on interna-
tional and foreign competition systems and the lessons to be
learned for the United States.100 A number of scholars can be clas-
History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 264-65 [hereinafter Peritz, Counter-History]
(arguing that antitrust history is a "series of attempts to balance the normative implications of
competition policy"); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 511, 512 (1989) [hereinafter Peritz, Genealogy] (reconciling the Court's diamet-
rical approaches to vertical restraints as the result of two competing paradigms-one the promo-
tion of competition, the other the protection of common law property rights); Rudolph J.R.
Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 285, 287-88 (1989) [hereinafter Peritz, Rule of Reason] (characterizing early
antitrust history as a competition between the goals of promoting competition and protecting
property rights).
99 PERTZ, CoMPETITION POLICY, supra note 4, at 4 (analyzing the historical relationship
between competition policy and private property rights); Carstensen, Examining History, supra
note 97, at 1217 (advocating for in-depth industry histories to judge the economic impact of
antitrust); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Consti-
tutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 260-61 (1989) (describing the
general economic theory of the Progressive Era and its impact on early antitrust history); May,
supra note 6, at 496-97 (describing the judicial treatment of constitutional challenges to state
antitrust enforcement); James May, Historical Analysis in Antitrust Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 857, 874 (1990) (arguing for increased research into the relationship between Constitu-
tional and antitrust law); James May, The Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman
Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 93 (1990) (discussing
the role of history in the study of antitrust and historical analysis of state antitrust activity);
Peritz, Counter-History, supra note 98, at 264-65 (discussing antitrust history in terms of com-
petition policy); Peritz, Genealogy, supra note 98, at 512 (analyzing vertical restraints under the
goals of promoting competition and protecting private property); Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra
note 98, at 287-88 (discussing antitrust history); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Three Visions of Managed
Competition, 1920-1950, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 273, 274 (1994) (analyzing the Hoover era and
trade associations, FDR and the National Industrial Recovery Act, and Congressional enact-
ments from 1930-50, including the Robinson-Patman Act, the Wheeler-Lea Act and the Celler-
Kefauer Act).
100 See Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World, 1992
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 238-40 (advocating a "one world" competition framework drawn from
the European Union's experience); Eleanor M. Fox, Internationalizing Competition Law to
Limit Parochial State and Private Action: Moving Toward the Vision of World Welfare, 24
INT'L Bus. L. 458, 461 (1996) (arguing that international cooperative enforcement efforts
should be guided by a "world welfare approach subject to national autonomy"); Eleanor M. Fox,
Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency,
Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 981, 982 (1986) (comparing the European
legal concept of "abuse of a market dominating position" with the monopoly law in the U.S.);
David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Dominance of Economic Power in Europe, 62 TUL. L.
REV. 57, 60 (1987) (analyzing the evolution of the legal doctrine of "abuse of a market dominat-
ing position" in Germany and the European Union); David J. Gerber, The U.S.-European Con-
flict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience Perspective, 34 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 123, 124-25 (1999) (analyzing the prospects for an international competition regime);
Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons From Antitrust and Beyond, 32
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 117 (2000) (raising three competition policy approaches generated from
abroad from which the U.S. would benefit); Spencer Weber Waller, Can U.S. Antitrust Laws
Open International Markets?, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 224-25 (2000) (arguing that
antitrust laws can be a "modestly useful weapon" to expand free markets, by addressing foreign
cartels and anticompetitive agreements aimed at the U.S.); Spencer Weber Wailer, The Common
Law of International Antitrust, 34 NEw ENG. L. REv. 163, 171-72 (1999) (arguing for a middle
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sified in more than one of these groups, illustrating the inclusive
nature of the post-Chicago space.
The correctness and utility of these new tools and approaches
remain hotly contested. Administrations change, courts remain
filled with appointees from prior administrations, and advocates of
the Chicago school and older theories continue to press their
case. 0 1 If anything, the intense professional debate about the right
type of economics to apply to antitrust issues has tightened the
grip of some form of economics as the dominant language of anti-
trust and made it even more difficult to broaden the language of
the discipline and the communities of expertise. What is interest-
ing is that even in the post-Chicago space, business discourse re-
mains marginalized as a myriad of new economic views take cen-
ground in the development of a global competition system implemented through existing inter-
national organizations and treaties); Spencer Weber Waller, Comparative Competition Law as a
Form of Empiricism, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 455, 461-62 (1997) (noting the rapid evolution of
foreign competition law, drawn in part from U.S. and European models and urging U.S. policy-
makers to study antitrust experiences of Australia, Germany and Mexico); Spencer Weber
Waller, A Comparative Look at Failing Firms and Failing Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 703,
703 (1996) (comparing the "failing firm" doctrine from U.S. antitrust law with the public inter-
est exemption from Europe and New Zealand, which allows some anti-competitive agreements
where they serve important societal goals); Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 349 (1997) (proposing the institution of a limited
international competition law system); Spencer Weber Waller, Law and Competition in Twenti-
eth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus by David J. Gerber, 45 ANTITRUST BULL 249, 250
(2000) (reviewing Prof. Gerber's arguments for an indigenous competition law in Europe);
Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation
and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1111, 1128
(1996) (examining U.S. and European Union approaches to international antitrust enforcement
and noting neither promotes substantive harmonization nor the internationalization of antitrust
law).
101 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL L. REv. 657
(2000) (proposing that the specific intent standard is required where the cost of false convictions
is high relative to those of false acquittals); Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompeti-
tive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J 573, 577 (1999) (surveying the procompeti-
tive justifications for vertical arrangements to assist the courts under a rule of reason analysis);
Malcom B. Coate & A.E. Rodriguez, Pitfalls in Merger Analysis: The Dirty Dozen, 30 N.M. L
REV. 227, 227 (2000) (applying Chicago school analysis to use and misuse of Merger Guide-
lines); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74
N.C. L. REv. 219, 219 (1995) (arguing that antitrust policy should focus on the acceptance or
rejection of normative, political assumptions and not on the inadequacy of economic data);
Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) (opin-
ing that the court's acceptance of the "sophistication doctrine," where some firms are thought to
possess better tactical information or knowledge, undercuts antitrust's economic principles);
Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89
(1999) (explicitly applying teachings of William Baxter to criticize expansion of the essential
facilities theory); Alan J. Meese, Economic Theory, Trader Freedom, and Consumer Welfare:
State Oil Co. v. Khan and the Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine, 84 CoRNELL L.
REV. 763, 765 (1999) (analyzing the Supreme Court's recent decision in which it applied ad-
vances in economic theory to conclude that maximum resale price maintenance may benefit
consumers).
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ter stage and vie for predominance.
E. Business Discourse in a Minor Key
Business discourse was marginalized in the antitrust commu-
nity early on because much of it was devoted to the very overthrow
or outright evasion of the core principles of antitrust. For exam-
ple, around 1914 Arthur Eddy and others pioneered the open com-
petition movement in an attempt to implement otherwise plainly
unlawful price-fixing agreements by having businesses exchange
and discuss the most minute details of their past, present, and fu-
ture prices and production so the same market outcomes could be
achieved without any formal agreements.102  Later examples of
business discourse were used to justify either the repeal or non-
enforcement of antitrust, in times of war, economic emergency, or
crises of confidence. A typical example of business theory attack-
ing antitrust came in the early 1940s. James Burnham wrote a
minor best-seller entitled The Managerial Revolution' °3 in which
he argued that business elites should control the production and
distribution of goods acting in concert. Burnham advocated an
elite technocratic business community planning and conducting a
"rational" economy rather than relying on a disorderly competitive
system. 104
A later form of business discourse antithetical to the goals of
antitrust enforcement came in the 1980s in which a rhetoric of
"competitiveness" was used to advocate the restriction or repeal of
antitrust statutes or their enforcement. Some of the most promi-
nent public advocates of this position included Malcolm Baldrige
and Robert Mosbacher while they served as Secretary of Com-
merce in the Reagan and Bush Administration. 105
102 EDDY, supra note 54. See generally PERr=Z, supra note 4, at 102 (ascribing the Su-
preme Court's growing tolerance for exchange of business information formerly thought to lead
to price-fixing to Eddy's theories of cooperative competition).
103 JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1941).
104 See id. at 71-138 (theorizing that business managers acting in concert will control the
production and distribution of goods in the rapidly transforming society through their control of
state institutions). See also Concentration or Confusion, FORTUNE, Jan. 1943, at 104, 104
(describing war production plan for concentration of industry); L.S. Homer, Volume Without
Profit Menaces Business, FORBES, Mar. 15, 1928. at 15, 15 (arguing that price cutting is
destructive); H.A. Toulmin, Jr., Is Price Cutting Legal?, FORBES, Nov. 15, 1929, at 40, 44
(arguing that price-cutting is restraint of trade); W. A. Vincent, Shall We Legislate Our Profits?,
NATION'S BUS., Apr. 1929, at 123, 126 (arguing that price competition is unethical); E.T. Weir,
Does Price Cutting Pay?, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1933, at 7, 7 (arguing that price-cutting involves
"destruction... of proper earnings for labor and for stockholders").
105 Correspondence from Malcolm Baldrige to Senator John Heinz, Export Trading Com-
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In addition to being an implacable foe of the goals of antitrust,
most business discourse simply was speaking in another language
that neither plaintiffs, defendants, judges, policymakers, nor com-
mentators spoke if they were part of the discipline of antitrust. If
the business theorists were saying anything useful, no one in the
antitrust world was listening.
To illustrate anecdotally the extent to which business theory
has been discounted by the courts, consider a recent non-fiction
book, which discusses the lives of the great business thinkers of
the twentieth century, in the author's words "the capitalist philoso-
phers."' 10 6 Of the thirteen figures discussed, not one has ever been
cited or discussed in a published antitrust decision.
There are many interlocking reasons why business discourse
has always taken a back seat to economic discourse in the formula-
tion and enforcement of antitrust policy. Historically the modem
business school and the accompanying academic business research
and discourse is a post-World War II phenomenon, 10 7 arising after
antitrust had already established itself as its own legal discipline
and after the antitrust profession already had claimed economics as
its special language. Even then, academic business theory was a
"fragmented adhocracy"' 0 8 in which there was no accepted hierar-
chy of what parts of business discourse held the most relevance or
which theories in the various sub-specialties had uncontested ac-
ceptance. Against this background, there was no single business
discourse that an antitrust outsider could readily identify and mas-
panies, Trade Associations, and Trade Services: Hearings on S. Rep. No. 27, Before the Senate
Comm. On Banking & Housing & Urban Affairs, 972' Cong., I' Sess. 22-23 (1981); Malcolm
Baldrige, Leading the Way to 2000, 10 Bus. AM. No. 10, at 7, 8 (Dept. of Commerce, May 11,
1987) (supporting relaxation of antimerger laws); August Merchandise Trade Deficit Narrows
as Imports Decline, Exports Hold Steady, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39 at 1241, 1242 (Oct.
2, 1985) (relating Baldrige's request for presidential review of outmoded aspects of antitrust
laws); Baldrige Says Trade Deficit Outlook for 1986 is "Clouded"-- Could be About the Same
as 1985, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10 at 301, 302 (Mar. 5, 1986) (Baldrige discussing need
to make antitrust laws "compatible with today's world"); Customs-F.A.S. Deficit for November
Expands $12.3 Billion, Commerce Department Reports, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2 at 62
(Jan. 8, 1986) (reporting Baldrige as urging updating antitrust laws); The MacNeil-Lehrer
NewsHour, June 26, 1989 (transcript available on LEXIS) (Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher
recommending easing of antitrust laws to aid U.S. competitiveness in world markets), at
http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
106 See ANDREA GABOR, THE CAPrrALIST PHILOSOPHERS: THE GENUISES OF MODERN
BusmFss-THER LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS (2000) (discussing work of Frederick Winslow
Taylor, Mary Parker Follett, Chester Barnard, Fritz Roethlisberger, Elton Mayo, Robert S.
McNamara, Abraham Maslow, Douglas McGregor, W. Edward Deming, Herbert A. Simon,
Alfred DuPont Chandler, Alfred Sloan, and Peter F. Drucker).
107 See vHrrLEY, supra note 5, at xxxi.
l03 at xxxii.
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ter in an effort to unseat the dominant economic language in anti-
trust. Much business literature was further highly descriptive,
atheoretical, and prone to short-lived fads. In contrast to econom-
ics, business theory frequently appeared unscientific, less aca-
demic, and less prestigious.10 9
At the most fundamental level, business discourse simply has
never been the language of the community of expertise, the disci-
pline of antitrust. 110 The community of expertise has been a blend
of lawyers and economists each taking turns dominating the dis-
course and helping steer to preeminence different legal and eco-
nomic schools of thought. Business leaders and theorists have
never been the players in this community which consists of the
present and former officials at the antitrust agencies, a handful of
similar staff from Capital Hill, the leaders of the private bar as
represented by the leaders of the ABA Section on Antitrust Law,1
and a smaller group of law professors and industrial organization
economists.11 2  Formal business training is relatively rare in this
group and access to, and interest in, the cutting edge of business
discourse also is rare.
1 13
Business theory requires a different mode of learning as ex-
emplified by the different modes of learning embodied in the case
method of business school and the case method of law school."1
4
109 See generally Andrew Abbott, Status and Status Strain in the Professions, 86 AM. J.
Soc. 819, 823-24 (1981) (discussing status hierarchies in academia and professional life); Stew-
art Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside their Doors IL" Some Notes on Two Recent
Studies on the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 526-27 (1982) (noting that law school
curricula rarely contain standard business skills and practices, though these comprise the bulk of
a lawyer's activity).
110 See EISNER, supra note 30, at 16-18 (discussing professionalism of antitrust enforce-
ment around language and discourse of industrial organization economics); id. at 91-98
(discussing the general theory of communities of expertise and effect on policy process). See
generally FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 92-108 (discussing the nature of discourse in shaping
accepted notions of truth).
11 For a discussion of the role of ABA Antitrust Section in shaping the discourse and
profession, see Waller, supra note 38, at 1445-46.
112 See EISNER, supra note 30, at 92-99 (describing the groups comprising the antitrust
community).
113 The only place in the antitrust community where business people served in prominent
positions was the FTC, which has had commissioners with business backgrounds from time to
time throughout its history. More often than not, these appointments have coincided with peri-
ods of lesser enforcement and lower prestige for the FTC. See William E. Kovacic, The Quality
of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 915,
917 (1997) (discussing the FTC's appointments record, selection criteria, and the impact of
appointments on agency performance).
114 For an example of the lengthier, more complex and empirical type of case materials
studied in business school, see, e.g., DAVID ARNOLD, THE HANDBOOK OF BRAND
MANAGEMENT passim (1992) (discussing effective branding strategies through case study
successes); COLLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 69 (containing a total of eight business case
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Most business discourse poses the additional hurdle of being an-
other voluminous body of literature to digest over and above the
demands of legal research and client needs. Much of this work
also tends to be more descriptive, less theoretical, and less suited
to constructing a single model for analyzing all aspects. Even for
the enterprising lawyer willing to tackle this literature, the nature
of the discipline and community of expertise would tend to filter
out as irrelevant, if not untrue, business discourse which conflicted
with the prevailing norms of the discipline of antitrust, whether
that be the earlier SCP paradigm, the Chicago school, or the more
recent post-Chicago thinking.
1 5
During the ascendancy of the Chicago school, business theory
and discourse were particularly devalued. What corporate defen-
dants and their agents actually thought or intended was devalued
ai either factually or legally irrelevant.' 16 Documents authored by
lower level employees were ignored as mere locker room talk or
unauthorized comments by persons not truly speaking for the cor-
poration.117 The significance of even such talk and writings by the
true leaders of the corporation was typically dismissed as the es-
studies); ARTHuR A. THOMPSON & A. J. STRICKLAND, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS
AND CASES passim (11th ed. 1999) (citing thirty-six case studies analyzing strategic planning,
implementation, and execution).
115 There are other more speculative reasons for the dominance of economic rhetoric over
business rhetoric within antitrust policy. Although beyond the scope of this article, they include
the status of economists and economic professors over their equivalent business theorists in
business schools. One minor illustration is the existence of the Nobel and Clark prizes for
economics and the lack of any equivalently prestigious awards for management theory. The fact
that many of the Nobel laureates have been economists on the faculty of business schools only
emphasizes the hierarchical and status differences between types of professors even within the
training ground for business people.
116 For example, in the area of predatory pricing the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
have squarely held that intent was irrelevant. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th
Cir. 1989) (stating "[t]his court has realized the futility in attempting to discern predatory con-
duct solely through evidence of a defendant's 'predatory intent'); A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose
Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that "intent is not a basis of liability.
. in a predatory pricing case under the Sherman Act"); Barry Wright Corp. v. lIT Grinnell
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that intent of a defendant will not be consid-
ered but rather, "the relation of the suspect price to the defendant firm's costs"). For cases from
other circuits preserving a role for intent, see ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 264, 264 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]
("In the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, direct evidence of intent is relevant to rebut
the ptresumptions created by prices above or below certain cost thresholds.").
See Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding insuf-
ficient evidence to prove that defendants engaged in predatory pricing in violation of antitrust
statutes, or that defendants made promises which they had no intention to perform); Morgan,
892 F.2d at 1359 (concluding that statements such as "we will not be underbid," "we'll do what-
ever it takes," and "name your price, "provide no help in deciding whether a defendant has
crossed the elusive line separating aggressive competition from unfair competition").
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sence of hard competition and precisely the type of ruthless atti-
tudes that made markets competitive. As Judge Easterbrook noted
in the 1989 A.A. Poultry Farms case:
[f]irms "intend" to do all the business they can, to crush
their rivals if they can ... Rivalry is harsh, and consumers
gain the most when firms slash costs to the bone and pare
price down to cost, all in pursuit of more business. Few
firms price unaware of what they are doing; price reduc-
tions are carried out in pursuit of sales, at others' expense.
Entrepreneurs who work hardest to cut their prices will do
the most damage to their rivals, and they will see good in
it. You cannot be a sensible business executive without
understanding the link among prices, your firm's success
and other firms' distress. If courts use the vigorous, nasty
pursuit of sales as evidence of forbidden "intent," they run
the risk of penalizing the motive forces of competition.'
18
Nowhere was the skepticism more evident than in the restric-
tion of liability for predatory pricing. Rather than being viewed as
a plausible business tactic to eliminate or discipline weaker rivals,
the rationality and very existence of predatory pricing was chal-
lenged on both a theoretical and empirical level. 1 9 Predatory pric-
ing, to the extent it existed, was recharacterized as either procom-
petitive hard competition, a misguided tactic which could not in-
jure equally efficient rivals, or a short term gift to consumers that
could not hurt competition except in the most unusual of circum-
stances where the predation was both successful and the dominant
firm was able to subsequently recoup losses and extract monopoly
rents.120 This skepticism was quickly echoed in the courts, which
118 A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at 1401-02. See also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 116, at 294-96 (collecting cases on the role of intent in predatory pricing cases). But see
William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech U11, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent, 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 293 (1993) (arguing for a valid but reformulated role for intent in predatory
pricing cases in response to the Rose Acre case). For a general critique of the role of intent in
section 2 cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035,
1038-41 (2000) (stating that the subjective desire to hurt your competition is consistent with
lawful competition in most circumstances).
119 Id.
120 See BORK, supra note 76, at 68, 144-48, 159-60, 347-64 (limiting theories of predation
to predation using governmental processes); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (analyzing and debunking common predation
theories); McGee, supra note 76 (analyzing allegations of predatory pricing in the Standard Oil
case); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980) (examining
then current theories and rules of predatory pricing).
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dismissed predatory pricing claims even when prices were proved
to be below some relevant measure of cost and the defendants
clearly intended to harm their rivals.
12 1
In the wake of the Chicago school onslaught, intent evidence
in all areas of antitrust analysis has been devalued, and with it any
interest in how business decision makers form their policies. So
much so that a recent Ninth Circuit decision rejected most intent
evidence as "no value" and a "fruitless inquiry" in all rule of rea-
son cases.'
22
The Chicago school adherents on the bench and in the agen-
cies during and following the Reagan administration were equally
dismissive of a wide variety of strategies that the businesses ap-
parently intended to use to avoid the constraints of aggressive
price competition. Regardless of how the corporations viewed
their own actions, mergers and vertical restraints were upheld as
plausibly procompetitive, efficiency enhancing, output expanding,
or necessary to prevent free riding.
Business executives, particularly those who found themselves
as actual or potential antitrust defendants, were the only group who
had both the interest in, and the mastery of, business theory to
challenge the dismissal of their discourse by the Chicago school.
But they had little cause for complaint. There was little incentive
to battle the prevailing economic norms of antitrust enforcement
when the results under the Chicago school analysis, which even if
incomplete from a business perspective, were so congenial to busi-
ness interests.
121 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)
(holding that Brown & wilfiamson's alleged pricing scheme was not likely to result in oligopo-
listic price coordination and sustaining supracompetitive pricing in the relevant cigarette mar-
ket); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (holding that Monfort's
loss of profits caused by petitioner's lowered prices after its merger with another large beef
packer did not constitute antitrust injury); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to consider the absence
of a plausible motive for petitioners to engage in predatory pricing); A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at
1396 (affirming a judgment n.o.v. for defendant because the jury verdict that defendant anti-
competitively under-priced surplus product and injured commercial rivals was not supported by
the trial record); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the jury's award of antitrust damages for predatory pricing was improper because
of the use of an improper cost standard and insufficiency of the evidence).
1 California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA, ANTtrRusT LAW § 1506 (1986)).
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III. TAKING MODERN BUSINESS DISCOURSE SERIOUSLY
"There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superi-
ority is not attainable, but to produce a relative one at the decisive
point, by making skillful use of what we have. ,, 123
Modem business discourse is replete with numerous lucid dis-
cussions of the managerial techniques necessary to successfully
achieve durable market power and how good managers can achieve
these goals and long-term supra-competitive returns.1 24  There is
the possibility that the Orthodox Chicago school rejoinder is in
fact right and such beliefs, no doubt sincere, are precisely the type
of behavior that makes competitive markets possible and negates
the very results being sought by aggressive managers. 125
The prevalence of such theories and the actual behavior of
managers and businesses toward these goals do, however, call into
question the assumption underlying the Chicago school, and much
of price theory itself, namely the rationality of economic actors.
Taking the famous Groucho Marx line seriously: "Who are you
going to believe, me or your own eyes?"1 26 this in turn suggests
that the real story of the struggle for market power is a plausible
one. Otherwise why would businesses so persistently apply these
kinds of techniques? If economic actors are indeed rational, then
123 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 197 (J.J. Graham trans., 1966) (1832).
124 See, e.g., Larry Light, Advertising and the Law of Dominance, J. ADVERTISING RES.,
Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 49 (discussing strategic factors managers can implement in order to become
a profitable "market dominant business"). See also supra sources in note 69.
125 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO.
L.J. 305, 307 (1987) ("[M]arkets both undercut successful monopolists and deter putative ones
without the help of judges."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. I-
5 (1984) (explaining the inhospitality tradition of antitrust, in which courts view business prac-
tices with suspicion, and arguing that this tradition leads to the condemnation of too many
beneficial practices); Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, and Future, 61
ANTrrRUST L.J. 99, 102-03 (1992) ("Firms want (intend) to grow; they love to crush their rivals;
indeed, these desires are the wellsprings of rivalry and the source of enormous benefit for con-
sumers .... the same elements of greed appear whether the entrepreneur wants to please cus-
tomers or stifle rivals."); Hovenkamp, supra note 118, at 1039-40 ("[I]n most circumstances
involving monopoly, the 'intent' to create a monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished
from the intent to do so competitively."). Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) where the Supreme Court noted:
It is not enough that a single firm appears to 'restrain trade' unreasonably, for even a vig-
orous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may capture unsat-
isfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result.
This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the
consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster.
12 Groucho Marx, Comedians and Humorist Quotes, available at http://www.comedy-
zone.net/quotes/comedians/marx2.htm (last visited October 1, 2001).
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such goals must be plausible, or least under certain circumstances,
or rational managers would have abandoned them for other tech-
niques to further their own interests at the expense of the corpora-
tion, or for a simpler life as a price-taker in competitive commod-
ity-type markets.
There is a common language of business, which revolves
around the conscious pursuit and exploitation of market power.
This language is taught consistently at the top business schools
127
and is the common curriculum and vocabulary of the business
leaders and their advisers with this background just as torts, con-
tracts, property, civil property, criminal law, and constitutional law
form and shape the common vocabulary of those of us with legal
training.
Managers learn techniques related to the acquisition and main-
tenance of durable market power from virtually their first day in
business school. A survey of the traditionally highly ranked
schools 128 offering a Masters in Business Administration ("MBA")
or its equivalent shows an extraordinarily consistent pattern of first
year required courses. While course titles and labels frequently
are different the contents are not. Quantitative skills such as ac-
counting, statistics, financial analysis, and economic theory 29 are
a consistent part of the package as are courses best described as
organizational behavior and design. More relevant to antitrust
127 The indoctrination in the language of business in all likelihood begins even earlier in
both undergraduate business programs and the common two year work experience in the busi-
ness sector which is either the formal or informal apprenticeship to many MBA programs.
172 The author reviewed the first year curriculum of schools ranked in the top twenty by
either Business Week or U.S. News and World Report for 1999 solely for the purpose of deter-
mining which required courses are consistently offered at the vast majority of graduate business
programs. The top twenty schools from Business Week were, in rank order, University of
Pennsylvania, Northwestern University, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, Har-
vard, Columbia, Duke, Cornell, Stanford, Dartmouth, University of Virginia, UCLA, NYU,
Carnegie Mellon, MIT, UC Berkeley, Washington University, University of Texas, UNC, and
Yale. See Business Week On-Line, B-School Rankings & Profiles 99 Update, Dec. 1999, at
(last visited Oct. 25, 2001). The top twenty according to U.S. News and World Report for 1999
were, in rank order, Harvard, Stanford, University of Pennsylvania, MIT, Northwestern, Co-
lumbia, University of Chicago, Duke, University of Michigan, UC Berkeley, Dartmouth,
UCLA, University of Virginia, NYU, Comell, University of Texas, UNC, Carnegie Mellon and
Indiana University. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 10, 2000, at 68. The only practical
difference for this study was that Indiana University appears in the U.S. News top twenty and
Washington University appears in the Business Week top twenty. Otherwise all other schools
appear on both lists although differently ranked for the most part.
129 For the most part, these required courses are introductory or intermediate micro- and
macroeconomic theory courses. While the macroeconomic curriculum would have little appli-
cation to antitrust principles, the inclusion of microeconomics does bear the possibility of seri-
ous cognitive dissonance in learning both the self-defeating nature of market power and at the
same time the tools to achieve lasting market power.
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purposes are the consistent inclusion of courses dealing with com-
petitive strategy 130 and marketing, both of which are premised on
the ability of a well-managed firm to obtain lasting market
power. 131
A. Strategic Planning
"Strategy is the great Work of the organization.
In Situations of life or death,
it is the Tao of survival or extinction.
Its study cannot be neglected. "
132
The most common technique by which managers seek (and
claim to achieve) that which the Chicago school claims is impossi-
ble is through a process of strategic planning. The current preemi-
nent theorist of strategic planning is Michael Porter, a professor at
the Harvard Business School. Porter's work is particularly signifi-
cant because he was trained as an industrial organization econo-
mist 133 but has chosen over the past twenty years to speak directly
to a business audience in its own discourse and not his own. As
Porter has noted:
The study of competition, in its full richness, has preoccupied
me for two decades. While trained as an economist and
steeped in the discipline of economic reasoning, I have
sought to capture the complexity of what actually happens in
companies and industries in a way that both advances theory
and brings that theory to life for practitioners. 1
34
130 Competitive strategy courses are part of the first year curriculum at Penn, Northwestern,
Michigan, Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, Virginia, UCLA, NYU, MIT, Washington University,
UNC, and Yale. At Duke, this is a required course in the second year. Competitive Strategy is
an elective at UC Berkeley and Texas. It is impossible to determine from publicly available
material whether or not such material is part of the required first year at Chicago, Cornell,
Dartmouth, Carnegie Mellon and Indiana.
131 Marketing courses are part of the required curriculum at each of these schools except
for the following: At the University of Chicago marketing is part of a group of six courses from
which the students must select four during their first year; at Carnegie Mellon it is part of a
group of 3 courses from which the students must select one during their first year; it is an elec-
tive at MIT; and it is impossible to determine from the publicly available materials whether or
not marketing is a required first year course at Cornell.
132 SUN Tzu, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A NEw TRANSLATION OF SUN TZU'S CLASSIC THE
ART OF WAR 21 (R.L. Wing trans., 1988).
133 For a comparison of Porter's older and more recent work, see Harvard Business School,
Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Michael E. Porter Publications, at
http:llwww.people.hbs.edu/mporter.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
134 MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPETITION 1-2 (1998). In contrast, a variety of prominent
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Porter's classic work Competitive Strategy135 begins with the
proposition that "every firm competing in an industry has a com-
petitive strategy, whether explicit or implicit. ' 136  In Porter's
words: "This book presents a comprehensive framework of ana-
lytical techniques to help a firm analyze its industry as a whole and
predict the industry's future evolution, to understand its competi-
tors and its own position, and to translate this analysis into a com-
petitive strategy for a particular business. 137
Porter offers a widely adopted five-factor framework for de-
termining the appropriate strategy for achieving competitive ad-
vantage. As set forth in the diagram below, Porter identifies the
rivalry among existing firms, as well as the threat of new entrants,
the threat of substitute products or services, the bargaining power
of buyers, and the bargaining power of suppliers as the principal
factors determining the state of competition and profitability. The
goal of competitive strategy for Porter is for a firm "to find a posi-
tion in an industry where it can best defend itself against these
competitive forces or to influence them in its favor."' 3 8  Firms do
this by positioning themselves so that existing capabilities best
defend against the current array of competitive forces, influence
the balance of forces though strategic moves, and/or anticipate
shifts in the factors underlying the forces and respond to them.
139
How firms do this illustrates how far business theorists like
Porter have moved away from the key assumptions of price theo-
rists and the orthodox thinking in Chicago school law and econom-
ics antitrust analysis. Porter argues that entry and mobility barriers
legal and economic scholars have addressed business strategy, but have done so through the lens
of post-Chicago economics. See Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and
Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2249 (2000) ("Modem theory is critically needed because
proof of predatory pricing under recent Supreme Court decisions requires a showing that the
alleged predation is economically rational, which is precisely what the newer theory demon-
strates."); Shapiro, supra note 95, at 125 (My aim here is to provide one participant's view of
what industrial organization economists have learned from the recent theoretical research and
where the field of industrial organization should go during the 1990s.").
135 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDusTRIES AND COMPETITORS (1980) [hereinafter PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY]. See
also MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE xv (1985) [hereinafter PORTER,
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE] (detailing "how a firm can create and sustain a competitive advan-
tage"); MICHAEL E. PORTER, ON COMPWETITION (1998) (collecting previously published shorter
works regarding competition).
136 PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 135, at xiii.
'" Id. at xiv.138 Id. at 4.
139 1a& at 29-3 1.
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are important and sets out a series of road maps as to how to
achieve such barriers to diminish the intensity of existing rivalries,
the likelihood of new entry, and the pressures exerted by custom-
ers and suppliers. 140  Price competition is not a preferred strategy
because it is not a long-term strategy that can be pursued without
imitation and industry-wide damage to profitability. 141
Threat of
New Entrants
Bargaining The Industry Bargaining
Power of Power of
Suppliers Jockeying for Position Customers
Among Current
Competitors
Threat of Substitute
Products or Services
142
In Competitive Strategy, and his later book, Competitive Ad-
vantage, Porter identifies three basic sources of long-term advan-
tage for a firm competing in any given market. 143  First, he dis-
cusses long-run competitive advantage stemming from becoming a
unique low cost provider of a good or service. 144 Second, he iden-
tifies similar competitive advantage flowing from selling a differ-
entiated product or service and charging a higher price than the
'40 See id. at 110-55 (developing a strategy toward buyers and suppliers and explaining the
differences in the performance of firms in the same industry).
141 See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 20-22 (arguing that a
strategy based solely on cost can "lead all firms in an industry to pursue the same type of com-
petitive advantage in the same way-with predictably disastrous results"); id. at 97 ("The stra-
tegic value of cost advantage hinges on sustainability."); PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY,
supra note 135, at 17 ("Some forms of competition, notably price competition, are highly unsta-
ble and quite likely to leave the entire industry worse off from the standpoint of profitability.")
142 PORTER, ON COMPETITION, supra note 135, at 22; PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY,
supra note 135, at 4.
141 PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 11-16; PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 34-46. Porter cautions that a producer must watch out for things
such as a lack of strategic choice, being caught in the middle, and repeatedly changing between
strategies, all of which are likely to lead to very poor performance and a position of competitive
disadvantage. See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 16 ("A firm that
engages in each generic strategy but fails to achieve any of them is 'stuck in the middle.' It
possesses no competitive advantage."); PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 135, at
41-44 (claiming that a failure to develop one of the three generic strategies leaves a firm in a
poor strategic position).
14 See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 12-14, 62-118; PORTER,
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 35-37.
2001] THE LANGUAGE OF LAWAND THE LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS 321
competition. 145 Finally, he offers what he calls focus as the final
generic strategy, "select[ing] a segment or groups of segments in
the industry and tailor[ing] its strategy to service[e] them to the
exclusion of others."
' 146
Differentiation is the preferred strategy since it leads to the
greatest likelihood that a sustainable competitive advantage can be
generated, and avoid the transitory gains and long-term losses as-
sociated with price competition. 147  Successful differentiation is
sustainable through the creation of various types of entry barriers,
mobility barriers, and switching costs, which combine to prevent
easy duplication by competitors or substitution by buyers. 148 Seek-
ing competitive advantage through being the low-cost provider can
be problematic, unless there are special circumstances that permit
the firm to achieve a significant lasting advantage that cannot be
duplicated by existing or potential competitors and not challenge-
able through general price competition.
49
Porter's preference for differentiation as a strategy to achieve
sustainable comparative advantage and the accompanying price
premium is perhaps best illustrated in his discussion of "good"
competitors versus "bad" competitors.15° Good competitors can
reinforce desirable industry characteristics and, under the right
circumstances, act as barriers to entry and mobility preserving the
comparative advantage of leading firms. 15 1 In contrast, bad com-
petitors will undermine existing industry structure, seek to obtain
market share through price competition, and contribute to the
145 See PORTER, COMPETrrIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 14, 120-63; PORTER,
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 37-38.
14 PORTER, CoMPIrrnvE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 15. As Porter acknowledges, a
focus strategy is really a combination of the first two strategies in terms of serving a narrow
market target. See PORTER, COMPEITVE STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 38-39 ("Even though
the focus strategy does not achieve low cost or differentiation from the perspective of the market
as a whole, it does achieve one or both of these positions vis-h-vis its narrow market target.").
147 See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 7 (discussing the growth of
generic cigarettes and the undermining of industry differentiation strategy); id. at 120 (discuss-
ing the superiority of differentiation as strategy); id. at 121 (discussing the possibility of differ-
entiating even a commodity product where prior competition was based on price); id. at 311
(discussing how redefining competition away from price can deter substitution).
148 See id. at 158-59, 311 (discussing the reconfiguration of a value chain in order to
achieve the positive results of differentiation).
149 See PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 13 (discussing competing
away gains from being a low cost producer through price competition); PORTER, COMPETrTIVE
STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 36-37, 45-46 (discussing the pros and cons of a low-cost position
and how to achieve one).
1" PORTER, COMPETmiVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 135, at 201-28.
151 See id. at 208 ("A good competitor can reinforce desirable aspects of industry structure
or promote structural change that improves the attractiveness of the industry.").
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commodification of the industry. 152
Porter lays out a veritable roadmap of how to build and in-
crease entry barriers, mobility barriers, and switching costs to
maintain competitive advantage in the face of a strategic challenge
from another firm.1 53  In his catalogue of strategies for raising
structural barriers, decreasing expected retaliation, and lowering
the inducement for attack, he continues to emphasize differentia-
tion, and downplay price competition, as the most effective strat-
egy for obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage. He tell-
ingly states: "Any fool can cut the price, goes the old maxim, and a
firm often hurts itself more than the challenger in defending in this
way."
154
David Aaker also argues that sustainable competitive advan-
tages are crucial to long-term success and available based on or-
ganizational assets and competencies. 55  Aaker agrees with Por-
ter's three sources of sustainable competitive advantage, but also
adds preemptive moves and synergy as additional sources of sus-
tainable competitive advantage. 156
Most, but not all, business professors agree in general terms
with the thrust of Porter and Aaker's work.1 57 Many offer different
advice for the formulation and implementation of strategic plan-
ning, but share a broad consensus on the achievability of long-term
competitive advantage for a successfully run business. 58  All re-
152 See id. at 214, 217 (discussing the entry of oil companies into the chemical and fertil-
izer business and the destruction of differentiation through price competition).
153 See id. at 482-512 (outlining a defensive strategy for firms to implement in order to
protect themselves from competitor attacks).
'54 Id. at 50 1.
155 AAKER, STRATEGIC MARKET MANAGEMENT, supra note 69, at 141-202.
156 See id. at 7 (claiming that three strategies "are frequently strategically important and are
not easily covered by the umbrella of differentiation and low cost-namely, focus, preemptive
moves, and synergy").
157 See, e.g., ROBERT M. GRANT, CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY ANALYSIS supra note 69, at
41, 80-84, 173-228 (2d ed. 1995) (adopting Porter's analysis, but offering a limited critique of
the model's failure to account for dynamic competition and contribution of game theory). But
see HENRY MINTZBERG, THE RISE AND FALL OF STRATEGIC PLANNING (1994) (discussing the
fallacy in believing in the ability to plan for the future based on the trends of the past and the
state of the present).
158 See, e.g., KENNETH R. ANDREWS, THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE STRATEGY xii, 13-14
(3d ed. 1987) (co-authoring a business text with Porter that discusses converting distinctive
competence into competitive advantage); COLLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 69, at 25-47
(discussing the achievability of economic rents); GRANT, supra note 157, at 18 (discussing the
goal of, and techniques for, establishing a position of "sustainable advantage over rivals");
KENICHI OHMAE, THE MIND OF THE STRATEGIST (1982) (discussing strategy as a quest for
competitive advantage); Richard P. Rumelt, Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm, in COM-
PETITIVE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 556-60 (Robert Boyden Lamb ed., 1984) (identifying
"isolating mechanisms" which limit erosion of economic rents).
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fute the explicit premise that markets are inherently competitive
and that firms are merely price takers, regardless of the strategies
they employ.
B. Marketing and Brand Management
Professor Gregory T. Gundlach, a business professor with both
law and business degrees, has written how marketing complements
and extends both the Chicago and the pre- and post-Chicago eco-
nomic schools. 159  As Gundlach has noted: "Marketing differs,
however, from an economic perspective mainly through the level
of analysis at which it studies exchange. Marketing focuses on the
individual behavior of participants versus how such individuals
might behave in the aggregate."'160 Most marketing studies assume
that both sunk costs and imperfect information are present to a
significant degree and focuses on the needs and wants of different
segments of consumers each with varying needs and degrees of
rationality.' 6 ' It fundamentally examines the process of exchange
from the point of view of economics as well as sociology, psy-
chology, anthropology, and biology. 162 Unlike the Chicago school,
marketing as a discipline views market power and barriers to entry
as omnipresent.163 It is thus highly empirical and individualistic in
analyzing the operation of a particular market.
Brand management is similarly devoted to a study of the tech-
niques that managers can use to differentiate their products and
charge higher prices or obtain other competitive advantages over
the unbranded, or less successfully branded, competing prod-
ucts.164 Selling a commodity type product is an anathema, because
159 Gregory T. Gundlach, Marketing and Modem Antitrust Thought, in HANDBOOK OF
MARKETING AND SOCIETY 34 (Paul N. Bloom & Gregory T. Gundlach eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Gundlach, Marketing] (examining the nature of antitrust law and its relationship to marketing);
Gregory T. Gundlach, Choice as the Focus of Antitrust: A Marketing Perspective, 62 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 527, 533 (2001) [hereinafter Gundlach, Choice] ("As a concept, 'choice' yields the poten-
tial for antitrust to more fully serve its goals of protecting competition and maximizing con-
sumer welfare.").
160 Gundlach, Choice, supra note 159, at 528.
161 See Gundlach, Marketing, supra note 159, at 44 ("Under the post-Chicago school, some
of the assumptions underlying perfectly competitive markets are relaxed to take into account
various market imperfections and other forces that alter market outcomes.").
162 See, e.g., id. at 40 (describing antitrust as an interdisciplinary field involving "wider
application of theories from other disciplines to antitrust policy development" and employing
"additional empirical methodologies in antitrust adjudication").
163 See, e.g., id. at 42-43 (discussing marketing's extension of the post-Chicago perspective
because both consider non-price benefits).
164 See LESLIE DE CHERNATONY & MALCOLM MCDONALD, CREATING POWERFUL
BRANDS IN CONSUMER SERVICE AND INDUSTRIAL MARKETS 10-20 (2d ed., 1998) (explaining
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price competition is the only available strategy for such products
and the ability to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage nearly
impossible.'
65
For example, Gillette was anxious to exit, or de-emphasize,
the market for disposable razors, despite having a dominant posi-
tion, since it viewed this segment as strictly a commodity market
involving competition based only on price. They devised a new
branded higher-quality higher-margin razor, the Sensor, to instead
compete on the basis of quality, brand name, and customer loy-
alty. 1
66
The greatest possible marketing triumph is turning a commod-
how a successful brand has the ability to sustain added value in the face of competition);
GRANT, supra note 157, at 208 (discussing the superiority of differentiation over cost advantage
as a strategy); KEvIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING,
MEASURING, AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 4, 9 (1998) (discussing how product differentia-
tion is the goal of brand management that has the non-price advantages of successful branding
including: brand loyalty, barriers to entry, and the creation of transferable legal property).
Product differentiation is an important entry barrier and limit to price competition. It is
also discussed extensively in the strategic planning literature. See, e.g., PORTER, COMPETITIVE
STRATEGY, supra note 135, at 9 ("Differentiation creates a barrier to entry by forcing entrants to
spend heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties.").
165 See DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 8, 11 (1991) [hereinafter AAKER,
MANAGING BRAND EQUITY]; GRANT, supra note 157, at 66, 76, 174 (pointing out that when
products of rival firms are indistinguishable, they are commodities and the only basis for
competition is price); KELLER, supra note 164, at 5 ("By creating perceived differences among
products through branding and developing loyal consumer franchises, marketers create value,
which can translate to financial profits for the firm."); JAMES F. MOORE, THE DEATH OF
COMPETITION: LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY IN THE AGE OF BUSINESS ECOSYSTEMS (1996)
(arguing that the growth of the internet and other changes in the business environment have
brought commodity-like trading to most markets); David A. Aaker, Should You Take Your
Brand to Where the Action Is?, in HARVARD BUSINESS REvIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 79,
86-87 (5th ed., 1999) (discussing the risks of becoming a commodity competing on price); Vijay
Vishwanath & Jonathan Mark, Your Brand's Best Strategy, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON
BRAND MANAGEMENT, 169, 174 (5th ed., 1999) (explaining how competing based upon price
can be dangerous because if the price is matched by competitors it can move the entire market
segment from premium pricing to commodity status); Rishawn Biddle, Feather Weight,
FORBES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 164 (noting a successful branding of feather bedding and stating "[a]
little artificial differentiation helps the retailers - shopping is not pure price comparison"); A.
Gary Shilling, Diamonds Aren't Forever, FORBES, Sept. 18, 2000, at 266 ("The end of the De
Beers monopoly shows diamonds have become a commodity."). Cf Ian Parker, The Emperor of
Ice, NEw YORKER, Feb. 12, 2001, at 59 (discussing the difficulty of creating national brand for
ice cubes).
For an early view of the importance of brand, rather than price, competition, see What do
They Mean: Monopoly?, FORTUNE, Mar. 1930, at 75 ("[The competition [businessmen] usually
believe in is not ordinary price competition; it is quality, or brand-name competition for domi-
nance in the market at a relatively stable price.").
166 See Vishwanath & Mark, supra note 165, at 169, 176 ("Gillette successfully made
consumers 'trade up' to a new spending level-and a new set of performance expectations.");
Richard E.S. Boulton et al., Managing Risk in an Uncertain World, UPSIDE, June, 2000, at 269,
274-76 (praising Gillette's strategy as a proper means to manage risk).
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ity type product into a true brand. One example is Perrier's ability
to turn essentially fungible natural spring water into a branded
beverage with customer loyalty and a substantial price premium
over the costs of the ingredients. 67 Other examples of commodity
products that have been successfully branded allowing both sub-
stantial product differentiation and premium pricing include
Perdue chickens, Chiquita bananas, and Nutrasweet which has ac-
quired and maintained high brand loyalty and brand equity' 68 with
a once-patented sugar substitute which has long since entered the
public domain.
169
Branding is nearly everything to the modem manager. The
brand may be the most valuable asset of a company. 70 In the case
of many high tech and dot-com companies the brand may well be
the only present valuable asset of the firm.17 1 Recent books in the
popular business press have extended this analysis in applying
brand management to people and not just products. 172 The success
of such instantly recognizable personal brands as Oprah, Sting, and
167 See DE CHERNATONY & McDONALD, supra note 164, at 10. Conversely, the authors
bemoan the fate of the British "fruit-squash drink" which moved in the opposite direction from
having a number of strong brands competing on non-price terms to a commodity market domi-
nated by price competition and private label goods. IL
168 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of brand
equity.
169 See AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY, supra note 165, at 20. See also Biddle, supra
note 165 (describing successful branding of the otherwise commodity product of feathers for
down products).
170 See KELLER, supra note 164, at 5 (noting that brand images "may be the only way to
distinguish different brands in a product category"). See also MARRIOTT INT'L, INC., 1999
ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (discussing what makes a great brand); Larry Light, The Changing
Advertising World, J. ADVERTISING. RES. Feb.-Mar. 1990, at 30, 31 (predicting that brands
normally will be companies' most valuable assets); Stuart Elliott, Brands that Shaped Marketing
in the 20th Century, and Some with Promise in the 21st, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1999, at C19
(listing highly subjective list of top 100 brands of the 20th century and brands to watch for in
the 21st century).
17 See, e.g., Kurt Badenhausen, Brandwagon, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 60 (reporting
results of over 100,000 surveys of which brands are on upswing or downswing and stating that
"[i]n the postindustrial age intangibles are everything"); Magazines: Branding in the Informa-
tion Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, in Advertising Supp.; Floyd Norris, Seeking Ways to Value
Intangible Assets, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 2001, at C2 (noting that investors need information
about the value of intangible assets, such as brand names); Al Ries & Laura Ries, The Hazards
of Corporate Vanity, UPSIDE, June 2000, at 252 (discussing eleven so-called immutable laws of
internet branding).
172 See STEDMAN GRAHAM, BUILD YOUR OWN LIFE BRAND! A POWERFUL STRATEGY TO
MAXIMIZE YOUR POTENTIAL AND ENHANCE YOUR VALUE FOR ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT
(2001) (describing how to create unique personal images, or "brands," to help enhance lives);
TOM PETERS, REINVENTING WORK: THE BRAND YOU 50 OR: FIFTY WAYS TO TRANSFORM
YOURSELF FROM AN "EMPLOYEE" INTO A BRAND THAT SHOUTS DISTINCTION, COMMITMENT,
AND PASSION! (1999) (describing ways to improve personal image). See also DE CHERNATONY
& MCDONALD, supra note 164, at 9-10 (noting that branding applies to products, people,
places, and companies).
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Martha (Stewart) and the value of the businesses bearing their
names suggests this is less far-fetched than may seem at first
glance. 173 The ubiquity of brands has spreaa to the non-profit
world as well in which the association of celebrities with charita-
ble fund raising in the medical research field has been referred to
as the "branding" of diseases. 174  At a more grandiose level, the
historian Daniel Boorstin has observed that brands serve the func-
tion that fraternal, religious and service organizations used to serve
to help define who people are and help them communicate that
definition to others.
175
The business community uses the term "brand equity" to de-
scribe the marketing effects uniquely attributable to the brand or,
in other terms, the value added versus having no brand associated
with the product or service. 76  As David Aaker has stated in
slightly different terms: "[I]t is a set of assets, such as name
awareness, loyal customers, perceived quality, and associations...
that are linked to the brand (its name and symbol) and add (or sub-
173 See Richard Sandomir, Russell Redux: A Private Man Bursts Back into the Public Eye,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at D3 (discussing renewed marketing effort of ex-Boston Celtic
basketball great Bill Russell in terms of revival of Russell "brand"); Gary M. Stem, Brand
Yourself, AM. WAY, Oct. 1, 2000, at 126 (stating that "as business intensifies and competition
heats up, individuals ... are using the power of personal branding to make themselves stand
out"); Gary Trudeau, Doonesbury, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2000, § 5, at 6 (featuring fictional third
party presidential candidate Uncle Duke stating, "I didn't even have a last name, much less a
fancy branded one like Gore or Bush").
174 Claudia Kalb, Stars, Money, and Medical Crusades, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2000, at 58-
59.
I" DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 145-48 (1973).
Several contemporary fiction authors also use this technique as their principal literary technique
to define their characters and the society in which they fit. Among the most prominent and
notorious of this group is Brett Easton Ellis. See BRETT EASTON ELLIS, AMERICAN PSYCHO
(1991).
176 See AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY, supra note 165, at 15-16 (defining brand
equity as "a set of brand assets and liabilities linked to a brand, its name and symbol, that add to
or subtract from the value provided by a product or service to a firm and/or to that firm's cus-
tomers"); ARNOLD, supra note 114, at 5-6 (noting that companies are increasingly viewing
brand equity as a tangible asset); DE CHERNATONY & MCDONALD, supra note 164, at 396-97
(defining brand equity as "the differential attributes underpinning a brand which give increased
value to the firm's balance sheet"); KELLER, supra note 164, at xvii (stating that "brand equity
represents the added value endowed to a product as a result of past investments in the marketing
activity for a brand"); John A. Quelch & David Harding, Brands Versus Private Labels: Fight-
ing to Win, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 23, 39 (5th ed. 1999)
(defining brand equity as "the added value that a brand name gives to the underlying product").
Cf. KELVIN LANCASTER, CONSUMER DEMAND: A NEW APPROACH (1971) (developing concept
of hedonic price analysis in order to estimate price advantage that differentiation strategy will
support). For a discussion of the differing ways to value brands and balance sheet treatment of
brand equity, see AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY, supra note 165, at 21-30; ARNOLD,
supra note 114, at 211-26; DE CHERNATONY & MCDONALD, supra note 164, at 413-18.
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tract) value to the product or service being offered."' 177
Branding is viewed as a source of a price premium or at least
the ability to make a successfully branded item less price sensitive
than its competitors.178  The concept of brand equity as a price
premium is illustrated as simply as Intel's periodic surveys to de-
termine how much discount would a potential customer require
before being willing to accept a personal computer without "Intel
Inside."'1
79
This segment of business discourse shares much with the SCP
paradigm in identifying branding and product differentiation as a
source of durable market power, 180 an insight sharply contested by
the Chicago school. 181 More generally, brand management con-
veys a point of view nearly one hundred eighty degrees opposite of
any version of industrial organization economics about how firms
acquire and maintain a dominant market position. As two business
commentators recently noted:
* The issue in branding ...always boils down to
the same thing: product vs. perception.
* Managers believe it's only necessary to deliver a
better product or service to win. But brands like
Coca-Cola, Hertz, Budweiser and Goodyear are
strong not because they have the best product or
service (although they might have), but because
they are market leaders that dominate their catego-
ries.
177 AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY, supra note 165, at 4.
178 DE CHERNATONY & McDoNALD, supra note 164, at 408. See also Saul Hansell, AOL
Raising Monthly Rate 9%; A Rival May Follow Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at C12 (noting
that AOL is able to raise its price without adding new features because people recognize AOL
as a "premium brand").
179 DE CHERNATONY & MCDONALD, supra note 164, at 408.
180 See AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUTrrY, supra note 165, at 275 (noting that "the brand
name and what it means combine to become the pivotal sustainable competitive advantage that
firms have'); AAKER, STRATEGIC MARKET MANAGEMENT, supra note 69, at 172 ("Another
way to differentiate is to build strong brands, to create brand equity. A strategy based on strong
brands is likely to be sustainable because it creates competitive barriers."); ARNOLD, supra note
114, at 1 (noting that a strong brand can deliver sustainable comparative advantage); Erich
Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker, Building Brands Without Mass Media, in HARVARD
BUSINESs REVIE V ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 1, 20-21 (5th ed. 1999) (citing in-house media
capability as a source of sustainable competitive advantage representing a significant barrier to
competition).
181 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 73, at 930-31 (arguing that rational consumers will pay for
advertising only if it reduces the overall cost of the product).
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* Which scenario seems more likely, A or B?
> Scenario A: A company creates a better
product or service and consequently
achieves market leadership.
> Scenario B: A company achieves market
leadership (usually by being first in a new
category) and then achieves the perception
of having the better product or service.
* Logic suggests Scenario A, but history is over-
whelmingly on the side of Scenario B. Leadership
first, perception second.
182
This scenario turns most conventional antitrust thinking on its
head yet opens an observer to strong new insights for antitrust
analysis as discussed below.
IV. AN ENRICHED ANTITRUST DISCOURSE
Business theory represents a rare chance to expand the com-
munity of expertise and for the discourse of antitrust to take into
account the discourse of the actual decision makers whose conduct
is being analyzed for antitrust purposes. Little of this work has
been integrated into antitrust doctrine or discourse. Few if any
decisions discuss either strategic planning or marketing in any
substantive way in assessing antitrust liability.
183
Business theory has only occasionally been part of antitrust
discourse once the litigation process has begun. Notions of strate-
gic planning were underlying much of the private antitrust litiga-
tion against IBM in the 1970s in connection with its decision to
make certain of its systems incompatible with the peripheral de-
vices manufactured by competitors, but these theories were rarely
successful as antitrust litigation strategies. 184  Similarly brand
182 Ries & Ries, supra note 171, at 256.
183 For example, the only citation to the work of Michael Porter in an antitrust decision
occurs in United States Football League v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1349 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing
a presentation by Professor Porter to the NFL as part of the factual background of the case).
18 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming
directed verdict in favor of IBM because IBM's technological innovations entitled it to maintain
the dominant position in the market it created through business acumen); In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that "the action
IBM took.., did not unreasonably restrict competition, and thus, did not violate the law"), affd
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management and marketing were part of the underlying theories of
liabilities in the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co.,185 which prohibited the conglomerate acquisition of
Purex bleach on the grounds that Purex's dominance of its market
would be entrenched by the addition of P&G's marketing muscle
and advertising budget. However, these decisions and the handful
of others exploring these concepts do so within the paradigm of
industrial organization economics rather than directly engaging the
business theory concepts on their own terms.
While it is dangerous to try to prove a negative, the number of
cases that even mention strategic planning or brand management as
concepts is few and far between. A LEXIS search in September
1999 found no antitrust cases discussing even mentioning "brand
management." A tiny handful of cases mentioned strategic plan-
ning, but in no case did the actual decision turn on any aspect of
the discussion of this concept.
186
A handful of commentators and government enforcers have
begun to coalesce around these ideas in the hopes of constructing a
richer discourse as part of the post-Chicago movement. Ironically,
it is a different line of Porter's work dealing with international
competition that has received the most attention. Porter's The
Competitive Advantage of Nations 87 is widely known and dis-
cussed in the antitrust community. In that work, Porter argues that
the nations whose firms are most successful in global competition
are from countries with robust competition policies.' 88 This argu-
sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding that ILC failed to prop-
erly define the relevant market since it relied primarily on "an internal IBM reporting procedure
designed to assist in product development and marketing, not to measure competition"), affd
per curiam sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transfor-
mation of the Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587 (1982) (discussing and criticizing the underlying theo-
ries and legal developments arising out of the IBM litigation).
"5 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).
18 See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1079 (D.D.C. 1997) ("For example,
Staples uses the phrase 'office superstore industry' in strategic planning documents."); Yeager's
Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing to
document from strategic planning conference of one of the parties); Alpha Lyracom Space
Communications, Inc. v. Comsat Corp., 968 F. Supp. 876, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (referencing
testimony regarding Comsat's strategic planning); Hudson's Bay Co. v. Am. Legend Coop., 651
F. Supp. 819, 830-32 (D.N.J. 1986) (referring to strategic planning meetings of parties while
discussing history of the industry).
187 MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). But see
ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991) (arguing that corporations participating in
global economy typically lack national identities).
188 See PORTER, supra note 187.
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ment has been widely disseminated and praised by both the head
of the Antitrust Division and the FTC during the Clinton admini-
stration' 89 and is the current rejoinder to the 1980s "competitive-
ness" critique of antitrust law. 190
While as yet ignored in the case law, Porter's work on strate-
gic planning is increasingly discussed in the law reviews.'91 For
example, Charles Weller, an antitrust partner with a prominent
national law firm, has argued in several fora that the work of Mi-
chael Porter forms the basis for a workable and vibrant antitrust
policy for both the United States and the European Union. 192 Most
189 See Joel I. Klein, Antitrust Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 32 CONN. L. REV.
1065, 1067 (2000) (former head of Antitrust Division stating "[tlhere are three books, in par-
ticular, that have had a big impact on my thinking, one by Michael Porter about seven, eight
years ago, taking off on Adam Smith, called The Competitive Advantage of Nations .... ");
Robert Pitofsky, The Effect of Global Trade on United States Competition Law and Enforce-
ment Policy, Prepared Remarks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 26th Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy, New York City 3 (Oct. 15, 1999) (stating
"[tihe governing principle of United States' antitrust enforcement was best stated by Michael
Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations"), at http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/ pitof-
sky/fobebfl.htm. Porter's work was also praised by Anne Bingaman, Klein's predecessor as
head of the Antitrust Division. See Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust Policy for the Twenty-First
Century, 48 SMU L. REv. 1669, 1674 (1995) ("This connection between competition and eco-
nomic dynamism accords with the findings of Professor Michael Porter's landmark study of
international competitiveness, The Competitive Advantage of Nations."); Anne K. Bingaman,
The Role of Antitrust in Intellectual Property, Speech Before the Federal Circuit Judicial Con-
ference, Patent & Trademark Session, Jun. 16, 1994 (praising Porter's work on the competitive-
ness of nations as basis for intellectual property antitrust guidelines), at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/94-06-16.txt.
190 See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of
Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 281 (1995) ("Hence, as the traditionalists see it, a
vigorous antitrust policy at home is the most effective way for a nation to promote world-class
performance in markets abroad. They thus agree with Michael Porter's recent findings .... ");
Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 209,
234 (1996) ("Professor Porter's research lends powerful support to the idea that antitrust laws
ought to be used to promote rivalry. The promotion of domestic rivalry is vital to the competi-
tive success of a nation's industries, and therefore to the economic well-being of that nation.");
Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhe-
torical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 41 (2000) ("In Porter's view, 'good' competitors play
by the 'rules of [the game],' allowing all to profit.") (quoting PORTER, supra note 187, at 213).
191 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing
Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 253, 304 (describing "Porter's model of
competitive forces" as "a catalog of bargaining power derived from various configurations of
interdependence"); Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Comment, Competitor Standing to Challenge a
Merger of Rivals: The Applicability of Strategic Behavior Analysis, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2057, 2088
(1987) (discussing Porter's suggestion "that a firm can enhance performance through strategic
moves designed to lessen the intensity of the five competitive forces: (1) threats of entry; (2)
rivalry; (3) pressure from substitute goods; (4) bargaining power of buyers; and (5) bargaining
power of sellers").
192 See Charles D. Weller, Can Japan Compete?: Empirical Findings Just in Time for
International Antitrust Policy, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 569 (2001) (book review praising
MICHAEL E. PORTER ET AL., CAN JAPAN COMPETE? (2000)); Charles D. Weller, Current Ameri-
can Antitrust Analysis is Mortally Wounded, and an Alternative is Already Well-Developed,
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recently, the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Task
Force on Fundamental Theory invited Michael Porter to speak to
the task force to assist it in analyzing the current assumptions un-
derlying antitrust law and policy.
193
Brand management and marketing more broadly also are be-
ginning to enjoy a revival as a source of wisdom for antitrust
analysis. In addition to the work of Professor Gundlach already
discussed, 194 FTC Commissioner Thomas Leary has begun to con-
sider the effects of marketing as a discipline on antitrust analy-
sis. 195
The limited use of business discourse in antitrust enforcement
so far has occurred largely outside the litigation process. Since
1976, most mergers and acquisitions of any significance are sub-
ject to premerger notification and a waiting period before closing
while the agencies determine the competitive significance of the
transaction. 96  One of the principal categories of information
which must be filed with the initial pre-merger notification are the
so-called 4C documents which consist of: "all studies, surveys,
analyses and reports which were prepared by or for any officer(s)
or director(s) . . .for the purpose of evaluating or analyzing the
acquisition with respect to market shares, competition, competi-
tors, markets, potential for sales growth or expansion into product
or geographic markets .... ,197
ANTrrRUST REP., Mar. 2000, at 2, 3 (suggesting that "Michael Porter's 'Five Forces' multi-
dimensional analysis of competition itself' coupled with "four Supreme Court developments...
provide a timely new approach for antitrust for the knowledge and joint venture economy of
today and tomorrow"); Charles D. Weller, A "New" Rule of Reason from Justice Brandeis'
"Concentric Circles" and Other Changes in Law, 44 ANTIrrusT BuLL 881, 948 (1999) (argu-
ing that "Michael Porter's new tools for analyzing competition itself' help "to update antitrust
joint venture law to the times, and craft a 'new' rule of reason").
193 See Notes on Remarks of Professor Michael Porter Before the ABA Section of Antitrust
Law Task Force on Fundamental Theory (Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Porter Remarks] (memo-
randum on file with author). This is a significant development given the centrality of the ABA
Antitrust Section and particularly its leadership in the formulation of antitrust discourse. See
Waller, supra note 38, at 1445-46 ("The antitrust world, to a large extent, is driven by the
American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section... and the antitrust partners of the large law
firms which dominate the Section and handle the vast majority of large anti trust matters. The
ABA Antitrust Section provides the most direct opportunities to demonstrate that you are a
member, and major player, in the antitrust club.").
194 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
19' See Thomas B. Leary, The Significance of Variety in Antitrust Analysis, 68 ANTITRusT
LJ. 1007, 1007 (2001) (explaining that "business can prosper to the extent they can transform
their offerings from the sale of relatively simple goods and services to the sale of experiences").
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
197 Antitrust Improvements Act Notification and Report Form for Certain Mergers and
Acquisitions, FTC Form C-4, 4(c) (revised 07/01) (instructions to item 4(c)), available at
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These documents are the starting point for discussions and
negotiations between private parties and the government enforcers
as to whether a transaction will be challenged and what
restructuring of the transaction will be sufficient to prevent a
challenge. 198 The discussion between private antitrust counsel and
the government is further guided by the current version of the
Antitrust Division and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which
embody many of the principles of Porter's work. 199 In another
example of greater sensitivity to business discourse, the Antitrust
Guidelines Collaborations Among Competitors jointly issued by
both the FTC and the DOJ call for an examination of the business
purpose underlying any joint venture being analyzed under the rule
of reason.2°°
These developments will affect who actually testifies in anti-
trust litigation and participates in conversations with the govern-
ment at the investigatory stage. As would be expected, the case
law discusses almost exclusively the admissibility and persuasive-
ness of economists serving as expert witnesses. These witnesses
are virtually exclusively drawn from academic economists, the
present and former government antitrust agency economists, and
the group of professional economic consulting firms working in
the major cities throughout the United States. The handful of
business school experts serving as expert witnesses in antitrust
matters are themselves almost entirely professional economists
rather than business theorists.20' Most attorneys are simply nerv-
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrform.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
198 See generally Irving Scher, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 3.52 (4th ed. 1995) ("The docu-
ments submitted under [4(c)] ... in many cases are the best early source of information for the
investigating agencies about the relationship of the business of the merging companies and the
possible competitive consequences of the transaction.").
199 DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev.
ed. 1997). See Memorandum from Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop to James R. Loftis, Ill,
Chair, Task Force on Fundamental Theory, Comments on Task Force Mission Statement (Jan.
2, 2001) (memorandum on file with author); Porter Remarks, supra note 193.
200 FED. TRADE COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.31 (2000) ("In examining the nature of the rele-
vant agreement, the Agencies take into account inferences about business purposes for the
agreement that can be drawn from the objective facts. The Agencies also consider evidence of
the subjective intent of the participants to the extent that it sheds light on competitive effects.").
201 For example, both of the principal economists in the government antitrust case against
Microsoft were prominent economists, although one currently serves on a business school
faculty. Richard Schmalensee who testified for Microsoft was an economist and the dean of the
Sloan School of Business of MIT. The government's expert, Franklin Fischer, taught economics
at MIT and had served as the principal expert for IBM in its successful defense against govern-
ment monopolization charges over a thirteen year period from 1969-1982. See generally
FRANKLIN M. FISCHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
UNITED STATES v. IBM 351 (1983) (explaining that expert witnesses in large antitrust cases
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ous about departing from the accepted discourse and proffering
expert testimony of a different type except as window dressing. °2
It appears that the tide is changing, albeit slowly. Traditional
antitrust economic testimony is coming under increasing scrutiny
following the Supreme Court's Daubert line of decisions.20 3  In
addition, innovative litigants have found that an expert steeped in
business theory can be convincing in telling a consistent and per-
suasive story that will convince a judge or jury of one side's theory
of the case.
For example, in Conwood Co., v. United States Tobacco
Co.,20 4 the plaintiff, a small producer of smokeless tobacco, relied
on expert testimony from Gregory Gundlach, as already noted, a
marketing professor from the University of Notre Dame, who
holds both a law degree and an MBA.20 5 Professor Gundlach's
marketing expertise formed the basis for his testimony as well as
his continuing research on how the process of exchange can help
illuminate issues of antitrust law and policy.20 6  This expert testi-
mony has proved quite effective to date constituting a key compo-
nent in the jury verdict in Conway's favor that exceeds $1 billion
"require[ ] skillful handling of the tools of economics" and "realize that their principal assets are
their professional reputations").
202 Beyond nervousness as to trial tactics, there is an additional institutional bias in favor of
the status quo type of economic expert in satisfying the newer formulations for the requirements
for expert testimony as set forth by the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (extending Daubert to apply to testimony based on "technical" and "other
specialized" knowledge) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-
93 (1993) (replacing the "general acceptance" test for admitting scientific evidence at trial with
a more critical "assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning and methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue").
203 See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding in part that an economist's testimony, which included constructing a hypothetical
market for stem drive engines, "should not have been admitted because it did not incorporate all
aspects of the stem drive engine market and because it did not separate lawful from unlawful
conduct"). For a more controversial assertion of the effect of Daubert on the admissibility of
economic testimony in antitrust cases, see Charles Weller, Antitrust, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1998
at B6, col. 2 (claiming that Daubert is "likely to create a new rule of reason, under which eco-
nomics ... must meet rigorous scientific evidentiary standards); Charles D. Weller, Antitrust
Economics as Science after Daubert, 42 ANTrrRUST BULL 871, 874 (1997) (predicting that
"Daubert may dramatically limit the new economic theories of 'unilateral effects' and 'innova-
tion markets"').
2o4 No. 5:98-CV-108-R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12797 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 10, 2000) (denying
defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a reduced damage award). See also
Brandon Copple, Chewed Up, Spat Out: Playing Extra Dirty in a Nasty Business, FoRRBEs, May
29, 2000, at 72 (providing a history of the Conwood case).
20 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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after trebling.
The Supreme Court has opened the window to all forms of
business discourse in the Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp.,2 °7 but the lower courts have only rarely to date fol-
lowed through on the invitation. Prior to Aspen, the black letter
law was that even an admitted monopolist could not be guilty of a
section 2 violation unless it could be shown that its market share
resulted from something other than "a superior product, business
acumen, or historical accident." 20 8 Starting with Aspen, the Court
subtly shifted the focus to whether the defendant had a valid busi-
ness justification for its conduct. 20 9 As more recent lower court
decisions have noted, the proferred business justification is the
most important issue in such cases.210  If the conduct has no ra-
tional business purpose other than its adverse effects on competi-
tors, there is an inference that it is exclusionary, and hence unlaw-
ful.211 The work of Michael Porter and the other business theorists
discussed above is precisely the type of tools to bring content to
this process and make this test something more than another in a
212long line of empty formulas in the monopolization area.
An additional salutary effect is to partially reclaim the role of
intent in antitrust analysis. Sophisticated corporations expend too
many resources in their strategic planning and marketing decisions
not to take seriously the results of that work. Looking at the re-
sults of strategic planning exercises, brand management, and mar-
keting studies do not necessarily lead to either plaintiff or defen-
dant verdicts. Such evidence should be a fertile source for either
plaintiffs or defendants seeking to unravel the purpose and effect
of mergers, joint ventures, distribution agreements, and other eco-
nomically ambiguous conduct being conducted under some form
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
208 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
209 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608 ("Perhaps most significant, however, is the evidence
relating to Ski Co. itself, for Ski Co. did not persuade the jury that its conduct was justified by
any normal business purpose.").
210 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stating that cutting prices for the legitimate reason of increasing business "is the very essence
of competition, which the antitrust laws were designed to encourage"); Steams Airport Equip.
Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The key factor courts have analyzed in
order to determine whether challenged conduct is or is not competition on the merits is the
proffered business justification for the act.").
2" See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 ("If a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on
some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.") (quoting
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRuST PARADOX 138 (1978)).
212 See William L. Reynolds & Spencer Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past of
Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811, 1823-27 (1995) (critiquing tests for monopolization as doctri-
nally incoherent and leading to subversion by lower courts).
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of the rule of reason.
Business discourse gives the government decision-maker, cor-
porate actor, judge, and jury an additional tool to analyze the most
persistently perplexing questions in antitrust. Unraveling whether
the defendant had a valid business purpose behind the conduct
harming competitors or sought to unlawfully exclude competition
may be impossible at a linguistic level for the reasons identified by
the Chicago school,21 3 but it is also impossible to determine the
issue without examining the decisions actually made by the key
decision-makers and the information they relied upon for their
decision. While the Chicago school properly has cautioned against
reliance on the language used by lower level employees, 1 4 a busi-
ness theory lens suggests a similar caution against reliance on such
evidence where it has no business significance for the defendant or
transaction being analyzed, not because it is inherently worthless.
The introduction of expert testimony and other evidence on
business theory may in the right case help illuminate these delicate
issues for the finder of fact in precisely the manner contemplated
by the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony. 215
The fears of the Chicago school that colorful language will be the
basis for plaintiff verdicts chilling competitive zeal can be better
dealt with other evidentiary and procedural tools such as motions
in limine under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.216
One recent example that suggests the power of unfiltered
business theory and its potential use by the enforcement agencies
relates to the series of FTC investigations of, agreements between
pharmaceutical companies regarding the sale of generic drugs to
competitors whose branded competing drug was about to go off
patent. In March of 2000, the FTC charged two drug makers with
violating section 5 of the FTC Act by reaching agreements with
generic drug makers to delay bringing competing generic drugs
into the market. On that same day, the FTC also announced that it
negotiated consent decrees with two other drug companies charged
213 See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
214 Accord Comanor & Frech, supra note 118, at 302-04 (non-Chicago school commenta-
tors arguing for continued role for intent in predatory pricing cases but conceding lack of use-
fulness in search for or reliance on so-called hot documents or stray statements).
215 FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.").
216 FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading of the jury .... ").
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
with similar violations. The nature of the violation was simple: by
keeping a competing generic version of a branded prescription
drug off the market consumers (and prescribing physicians) had
been deprived of a clear choice between branded and generic
medicine which had the potential to save hundreds of millions of
217dollars per year. Shortly thereafter, a district court in Michigan
agreed with this analysis and held that one of these agreements
constituted per se unlawful market allocation in a private consumer
class action.218
The FTC appears to be wielding business theory and business
discourse as a sensitive tool to distinguish between those types of
agreements that it will challenge and those it will not. The FTC
recently has chosen not to charge Eli Lilly for its agreement with a
drug manufacturer that manufactured a competing version of a
Lilly drug about to go off patent.219  While the public record is
silent as to the precise basis for the FTC's decision not to proceed,
one fact stands out. Lilly acquired rights not to produce a generic
clone of its drug, but to a new substance that performed the same
functions as the branded drug but without certain key side effects.
Presumably the FTC did not view this agreement as the type of
collusion it had previously challenged, but instead chose not to
proceed following the standard antitrust joint venture or acquisi-
217 See Press Release, FTC Charges Drug Manufacturers with Stifling Competition in Two
Prescription Drug Markets, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/hoechst.htm (Mar. 16, 2000)
("'The financial arrangements between the branded and generic manufacturers were designed to
keep generic versions of Cardizem CD and Hytrin off the market for an extended period of
time,"' and "'have the potential to cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars each year')
(quoting Richard Parker, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition.). See also FTC Cites
Schering-Plough for Negotiating Anticompetitive Accords with Generic Makers, 80 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 2003, at 328 (Apr. 13, 2001) (detailing a similar allegation involv-
ing medication to treat low blood potassium levels); Melody Petersen, Ivax Says Bristol-Myers
Deal Aims to Delay a Generic Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at C6 (reporting similar alle-
gations involving a cancer drug).
218 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1278 (E.D. Mich. June 6, 2000)
(Order No. 13). The FTC plans to issue a large number of civil investigative demands seeking
information on similar licenses more broadly throughout the pharmaceutical industry. See FTC
Will Conduct Study of Generic Drug Competition, Seeks Input on Data Collection, 79 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1979, at 365 (Oct. 13, 2000) ("The commission explained that its
proposed study would examine whether brand-name and generic drug manufacturers have
entered into agreements or have used other strategies in an effort to delay competition from
generic versions of patent-protected drugs.").
219 See Pamela Saner, Waiting for the Generics Feast, CHEMICAL MARKET REP., May 15,
2000, at 25, 27 ("The Federal Trade Commission recently approved the licensing agreement that
allows Eli Lilly to exclusively develop and globally commercialize (R) - fluoxetine."). But see
Courts Won't Dismiss Zenith's § 1 Claims of Delayed Entry into the Generic Market, 80 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1991, at 48 (Jan. 19, 2001) (refusing to dismiss private
antitrust suit challenging alleged conspiracy by Lilly and others to delay entry by generic com-
petitors).
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tion analysis it routinely undertakes in this and other high tech
industries. Careful consideration of business purpose in the lan-
guage which the parties use in the day-to-day conduct of their
business can help distinguish between collusive attempts to pre-
serve branded market power and more legitimate joint ventures
where consumers stand to benefit through increased opportunities
to treat their conditions without debilitating side effects.
The use of business theory and the separate discourse that it en-
tails are what is important, not the result in a particular case. The
lawfulness of the competitive consequences of business behavior in
the real world must be examined in light of the business leader's
commitments to these techniques and discourse if business theory is
to be taken seriously and not filtered through the different and highly
technical and ever-changing discourse of industrial organization eco-
nomics.
One final benefit that would emerge would be to reconnect an-
titrust to the popular will and imagination. While the Microsoft
litigation perhaps has put antitrust back in the public eye, it re-
mains a highly technical discourse that shuts out those who have
not mastered its arcane terminology. The rise of industrial eco-
nomics has been one of the principal forces that transformed anti-
trust from a populist movement to one more typically debated in
expert circles. The revival of business theory as one source of
wisdom for antitrust decision-making has the potential of making
antitrust part of the civic discourse for a broader circle of persons.
This enlarged community of persons will help break the monopoly
of the current community of experts and can study, analyze, and
debate the important decisions being made as a result of their use
and familiarity of business decision-making from their life experi-
ences in modern society. Where that leads us long term is un-
knowable in terms of antitrust policy, but it leads in the direction
of a more accountable and understandable antitrust policy as it
grapples with the many forms of business behavior in an ever-
changing economy.
CONCLUSION
Changing a discourse is a difficult and tricky business. For
reasons of history, path dependence, sociology, the highly depart-
mentalized structure of the modern law firm, institutional inertia,
self-interest, and intellectual simplicity, antitrust, like most disci-
plines, has its own truth. Antitrust sticks almost exclusively with
the now familiar language of law and economics, even as it hotly
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debates which type of economics best serves the antitrust profes-
sion. It regards all other discourses with suspicion and too often
dismisses new theories and paradigms as untrue or irrelevant to the
discipline. It would indeed take cataclysmic events to dislodge
economics from its privileged position.
Antitrust, like any other form of discourse, contains within it-
self the seeds of its own opposition. Every use of economics as a
decision tool creates a hydraulic pressure to recognize and deal
with legal issues using opposing conceptions of truth and social
science. These rhetorical forces of opposition rarely become
dominant but remain active at the margin of the discipline appear-
ing from time to time both to challenge and reinforce the primacy
of the predominant strain of professional discourse.
The realistic goal then is not to supplant economic discourse
in antitrust, but instead to take advantage of the post-Chicago
space to reintroduce business theory as a more prominent part of
antitrust discourse directly, and without first filtering its message
through the highly technical language of industrial organization
economics, regardless of which flavor of that discipline is favored
at a particular moment in time.
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